



Office of the
Secretary-General's Special Adviser
on Community Based Health and Aid Delivery

Note: The data below was gathered by Paul Farmer's UN office. He served as a Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (on a \$1 a year basis) from 2009 - 2019. Please attribute any data below to Paul Farmer's UN office or the Office of the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Community Based Health and Aid Delivery.

HAITI 2010 EARTHQUAKE: KEY FACTS and FIGURES

- The damage was assessed at \$7.9 billion. (Post Disaster Needs Assessment/PDNA).
- The Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (2010-2020) tried to lay out a blueprint - requesting \$11.5 billion.
- Donors pledged \$8.3 billion toward the UN NY donor conference and an additional \$2.4 billion for other recovery efforts for a total of \$10.7 billion.
- International NGOs raised an additional \$3.06 billion for earthquake response and recovery efforts.
- **Overall humanitarian and recovery funding disbursed from bilateral and multilateral donors between 2010-2012:** \$6.4 billion (\$2.42 billion in humanitarian and \$4.01 billion in recovery).
- Of the \$6.4 billion disbursed between 2010-2012, **less than 10 percent was disbursed directly to the GOH using its systems;** less than 0.6 percent was disbursed directly to Haitian organizations and businesses as program grants.

As of January 1, 2020 (figures subject to change):

Flash Appeal for immediate emergency response (Released by UN on January 15, 2010)	\$575 million
UN/WB/GOH/ECLAC Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) released on March 24, 2010	\$7.9 billion (of damages) *subset of \$11.5 billion of Action Plan for National Recovery and Development
Requested by Government of Haiti for Ten Year Action Plan (2010-2020) for National Recovery and Development of Haiti at the UN Donor Conference on March 31, 2010:	\$11.5 billion
Pledged by Donors for Recovery and Development at the UN Donor Conference on March 31, 2010 (pledged on the day of the conference) Other funding for recovery pledged after the donor conference	\$8.33 billion, which includes: \$5.37 for 2010-2012 \$2.96 billion for 2013-2020 ----- \$2.43 billion ----- Total: \$10.76 billion
Disbursed by Donors for Humanitarian and Recovery 2010-2012	\$6.43 billion for 2010-2012 (\$4.01 billion in recovery + \$2.42 billion in humanitarian)
Note on Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) Note on the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF)	The IHRC's creation was announced at the March 2010 donor conference in NY. It was then formally established (approved by Haitian lawmakers) in April 2010. The IHRC was <u>only</u> an advisory body. It was not set up for the receipt or disbursement of any funding and therefore did not manage any of the reconstruction/recovery funding. The Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) was created in April 2010. It could only disburse to three multilateral institutions: the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations and the World Bank.
Estimated raised privately (2010-2012) by NGOs	\$3.06 billion
Private funding estimated disbursed in 2010-2012	\$1.18 billion
Estimated total disbursed from 2010-2012 Note: Dr. Farmer's UN team has requested donors provide up-to-date information related to their pledges, commitments and disbursements and will release these figures as soon as the majority of donors respond. (To date, the top ten donors have not all responded.)	\$6.43 billion (bilaterals/multilaterals) \$1.18 billion (NGOs from private funding) Total: \$7.61 billion (2010-2012)

Lessons Learned

What lessons did we learn since the earthquake in Haiti? Over the past ten years Dr. Farmer's UN team has researched and analyzed aid trends in Haiti and other fragile settings.

What have we learned from donor trends in Haiti and other fragile settings?

1. **Humanitarian responses often miss the opportunity to a) bolster critical local public and private rescue and emergency efforts, and b) lay the groundwork for strengthening the public sector:** Immediately following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti the international community rushed in to deliver lifesaving assistance. Between 2010-2012, donors spent \$2.4 billion on the humanitarian response and almost none of it (.9%) was disbursed to national authorities or local institutions. The UN flash appeal did not request any funding for any public sector institution.

Haiti is not unique - data from the United Nations shows that only five percent of all humanitarian assistance between 2007 – 2011 was spent in support of the public sector of the recipient country. In addition, of the \$4.27 billion received through UN humanitarian global flash appeals in 2012, only 0.6 percent was channeled directly to local organizations. (No funding was channeled to any government agencies; they are not eligible to participate in the flash appeals.) Another relevant example can be seen in relation to the recent Ebola crisis in West Africa: Liberia received an estimated \$571 million in ODA in 2012, yet only 3.5 percent of it went to national institutions which hindered the development of its national public health system.

Facts and Figures on Humanitarian Aid to Haiti

- **Humanitarian funding from bilateral and multilateral donors, 2010-2012:** \$2.42 billion, of which 0.9 percent was channeled directly to the GOH.
- **Local procurement:** In Haiti, one of the top bilateral donors reported that it awarded 1.4 percent of its contracts to local companies from 2010-2012.
- **Cash transfers:** In Haiti, only 2.4 percent of humanitarian funding from bilateral and multilateral donors in 2010-2012 was recorded as relating to cash transfer programmes.

2. **National plans for recovery post-crises often do not accurately reflect actual needs and goals:** National plans for recovery following crises are usually drafted in close coordination with donors and consequently can result in low and unambitious projections and ideas.

In Haiti, both the PDNA and the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development were led by international experts who were given little time to lead a process with meaningful participation from national actors. The drafting of the documents was rushed because of the urgent deadline set by donors of the March 2010 international donor conference, positioned as the one chance for Haiti to ask for resources.


Though the post-earthquake narrative was that the \$10.7 billion that donors had pledged would put Haiti on the path to a better future, it did not cover significantly more than the cost of the economic and physical damage incurred. A similar trend can be found in the national plans that were presented for Ebola recovery at the 2015 International Ebola Recovery Conference in New York where the recipient countries were put in the position to negotiate with donors the total recovery figure that would be presented at the pledging conference and the goals were consequently quite low.

3. **Tracking of donor aid is rarely done in settings of fragility:** There is no institution mandated to track donor pledges and disbursements following international donor conferences. President Clinton and Paul Farmer's UN office was the only entity tracking pledges, commitments and disbursements to Haiti following the earthquake and cholera outbreak as well as the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. (See www.lessonsfromhaiti.org and www.ebolarecovery.org).

4. **Disbursements rates, while critical, are not the full story.** Though donors are often critiqued for low disbursement rates, in the case of Haiti, that may not have been the primary problem with making progress toward development goals over the past decade. Disbursements rates were at 53.2% between 2010-2012 but it's not clear what the rate is today nor is it clear what the full scope of accomplishments may have been as donors have not provided requested data at this time. If outcomes are poor and disbursement rates are reasonable, we can hypothesize that a) the amount of ODA requested and pledged was too low, and b) the majority of the ODA did not stay in Haiti and instead went to international NGOs and contractors headquartered in donor countries. Not enough ODA went toward the public sector, strengthening key services.

A critical metric to any recovery or development effort is the percentage of aid that stays in country: An estimated 75% of all ODA to the poorest countries never reaches the recipient country. In addition, UN flash appeals almost always do not allow for the recipient government to receive funding. Bypassing of the public sector has a significant impact on development outcomes as there is a correlation between investment in the public sector and a decrease in poverty and disease. This correlation can be seen in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Least Developed Countries Receiving ODA Through Their National Systems Are Making More Development Progressⁱ



As shown in Figure 1, when countries in fragility are placed on a scatter plot, there is a strong correlation between the percentage of ODA received through national systems and progress toward the Millennium Development Goals. When donors do invest through the public sector, recipient countries have seen tremendous gains in health and overall wellbeing. For example, over the last 20 years, Rwanda, has received 56% of its ODA through national systems and has posted some of the strongest development progress ever documented.ⁱⁱ

ⁱ Percentage of ODA channeled through country systems based on estimates of the Office of Dr. Paul Farmer from the OECD’s Paris Declaration Survey and the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System. Progress scores are based off of UNDP’s Millennium Development Goal Indicators.

ⁱⁱ Farmer, Paul, Cameron Nutt, and Claire Wagner. “Reduced Premature Mortality in Rwanda: Lessons from Success.” *British Medical Journal*. January 2013.