



Tracking Donor Funding Toward the Global COVID-19 Response: An Analysis of Pledges, Commitments and Disbursements

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July 22, 2025

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

We extend our gratitude to Habib Mayar, Deputy General-Secretary of the g7+ Secretariat, Nelson Amaya, Policy Analyst at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and Hannah George, Lead, Access to Information Unit at the World Bank, for their valuable review, expertise, and contributions. We also acknowledge the World Bank's commitment and support for this initiative. Without their input, this report would not have been possible.

We are also grateful to Louise Ivers, M.D., Professor of Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School and Director of the Harvard Global Health Institute, for her invaluable insights and guidance as we wrote and finalized this report over the past four years.

Author's Note

The restructuring of U.S. development assistance following the dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development in early 2025 marks a defining moment—one that demands reflection. This report offers an examination of global COVID-19 aid flows, tracing not just the numbers but the deeper implications of how assistance is delivered, where it is directed, and whether it strengthens the very institutions meant to sustain health, wellbeing and sustained progress.

For almost 15 years, we had the privilege of serving alongside the late Dr. Paul Farmer of Harvard University—a physician, global health leader and Under Secretary-General at the United Nations. He understood that while development assistance has led to extraordinary global health gains—from lowering child mortality to expanding vaccine access—its impact is precarious when it does not root itself in the public sector. His scholarship shows that investments in national institutions, local economies, and frontline capacity are what build lasting change. While working with Dr. Paul Farmer and President Clinton at the United Nations we tracked development assistance to the world's poorest countries - from the [2010 earthquake](#) and cholera outbreak in Haiti to the 2014 [Ebola outbreak](#) in West Africa, uncovering a sobering trend: the vast majority of assistance from donor governments bypasses national institutions in the very countries it is intended to support.

This report on the global COVID-19 response builds on that legacy, tracking the pledges, commitments, and disbursements made by donor governments and multilateral institutions. Our analysis shows that of the \$207.9 billion of COVID-19 funding pledged by bilateral and multilateral donors for the pandemic response, \$170.9 billion was disbursed. Strikingly, 60 percent of that funding was provided in the form of loans rather than grants. Only 8.9% percent of disbursed funds were allocated as grants to partner governments, reinforcing a long-standing pattern of bypassing national institutions. The consequences of this approach are significant. While foreign aid has unquestionably contributed to global health gains—reducing child mortality, increasing access to vaccines, and responding to public health crises—its effectiveness is hampered when it circumvents the public sector.

We feel it is critical to recognize that the current abrupt reduction or elimination of foreign aid—when millions of people rely on it for life-saving treatment, vaccinations, and health services—has consequences. Cutting off aid does not merely disrupt development; it directly endangers lives. And contrary to the dominant narrative, cutting foreign aid directly affects the livelihood of American citizens as the majority of U.S. foreign assistance is disbursed through American contractors and non-governmental organizations.

The COVID-19 pandemic response demonstrated how swiftly resources could be mobilized at an unprecedented scale. However, the full impact of COVID-19 funding remains unclear. This report focuses on transparency, enabling further analysis of how effectively the funding was utilized.

In today's context, where foreign aid is under attack, our goal is to provide an evidence-based analysis. It is true that aid has often been delivered in ways that undermine state capacity in recipient countries. But it is also true that foreign aid remains a vital tool for global stability, economic development, and poverty reduction. Official development assistance represents just a fraction of donor country budgets - in the United States, approximately 1 percent (prior to the Trump Administration).¹ Yet its impact can be profound.

The findings of this report should not be used as an instrument to further dismantle foreign aid but rather to continue meaningful dialogue about reform. If development assistance is to fulfill its promise, it must be rooted in evidence-based approaches that create a more stable, economically viable world. When aid is thoughtfully designed, it does more than support those in need—it strengthens economies, fosters security, and weaves a more stable and interconnected world. It's true measure lies not just in its immediate impact, but in the lasting foundation it helps build for generations to come.

Jehane Sedky and Abbey Gardner

July 22, 2025

¹ Drew Desilva, "What the data says about U.S. foreign aid," Pew Research Center, February 6, 2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/02/06/what-the-data-says-about-us-foreign-aid/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

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Index of Terms

Partner Governments: Governments that are recipients of official development assistance. This term is interchangeable with “recipient governments.”

Global South: A term that refers to countries that are eligible to receive official development assistance. The term is often used to describe a group of countries with a shared experience of colonialism or marginalization in the global economy.

Channel: A category of entities that receive funds in the first level of disbursement by a donor. Examples include: partner governments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. Please refer to pages 55-58 for definitions of each channel.

g7+: Established in 2010, the g7+ is an intergovernmental organization that represents 20 conflict-affected countries and countries in fragility. It obtained observer status at the United Nations in 2019. Member States include: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros Islands, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome e Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Yemen.

Least Developed Countries: The Least Developed Country (LDC) category was created by the UN General Assembly in 1971 as a way to support countries facing poverty and structural impediments to development.

The 45 countries categorized as “Least Developed Countries” are:

Africa (33): Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia

Asia (8): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Yemen

Caribbean (1): Haiti

Pacific (3): Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu

Acronyms

ACT Accelerator: [Access to COVID-19 Tools \(ACT\) Accelerator](#)

COVID-19: The [disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus](#)

g7+: [Group of Seven Plus](#)

HIPC: [Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative](#)

IATI: [International Aid Transparency Initiative](#)

LDC: [Least Developed Countries](#)

OCHA: [Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs](#)

ODA: [Official Development Assistance](#)

OECD: [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](#)

OECD CRS: [OECD Creditor Reporting System](#) (since July 2024 part of the [OECD Data Explorer](#))

PEPFAR: [President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief](#)

SDGs: [Sustainable Development Goals](#)

SII: [Science of Implementation Initiative](#)

USAID: [United States Agency for International Development](#)

WHO: [World Health Organization](#)

Executive Summary

By mid-March 2020, as COVID-19 cases surged across Europe and the United States, the global nature of the crisis became evident, although at that time the far-reaching implications were still not widely understood. Platforms tracking COVID-19 funding existed, but the amount reported for the global response ranged from \$136.5 billion to \$21.7 trillion in donor commitments.² Despite the billions of dollars announced by numerous donor governments, development banks and foundations, no platforms were tracking the funding that government donors, multilateral organizations and private funders had pledged.

This report focuses on tracking the financial flows in the form of official development assistance (ODA) of donor pledges, commitments, and disbursements related to the global COVID-19 response. While other analyses have explored issues such as patent transfers, local vaccine production, and the provision of medical supplies, this report tracks financial promises made by donor entities and analyzes how much was actually disbursed and where it was invested.

In addition to providing data on donor pledges, commitments and disbursements, this report assesses how much ODA was disbursed to the public sector in partner countries – highlighting commitments donors made in the international agreements they signed on to in Paris (2005)³, Accra (2008)⁴ and Busan (2011).⁵ (Please see Annex I for further information on the commitments donors made in international aid effectiveness agreements.) In addition, we reviewed whether newly created funding mechanisms and pooled funds such as the COVID-19 Pandemic Fund (managed by the World Bank) have the ability to disburse directly to national and local institutions in partner countries.

² The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) COVID-19 Funding Dashboard figures are available: <https://data.humdata.org/viz-iati-c19-dashboard/>. The Devex tracker ran from Jan. 1, 2020, to June 27, 2021. Figures are available at: <https://www.devex.com/news/interactive-who-s-funding-the-covid-19-response-and-what-are-the-priorities-96833>.

³ “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,” OECD Publishing, Paris, 2005, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264098084-en>.

⁴ “Accra Agenda for Action,” OECD Publishing, Paris, 2008, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264098107-en>.

⁵ “Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation,” OECD Publishing, Paris 2011, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/busan-partnership-for-effective-development-co-operation_54de7baa-en.html.
“The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2011, [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/INCAF\(2011\)4/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/INCAF(2011)4/en/pdf).

The key findings of this report include:

For all donors (donor governments and multilateral institutions), key data from 2020-2022:⁶

- **Amount of ODA that donor governments (bilaterals) and multilateral donors pledged (or publicly announced) toward the COVID-19 response globally: \$207.9 billion.**
- **Amount of ODA disbursed globally: \$170.9 billion** or 82.2 percent of all pledges.
- **Amount of ODA disbursed in support of the 45 poorest countries in the world categorized as Least Developed Countries (LDCs): \$35.3 billion** or 20.7 percent of the total disbursed.⁷
- **Of the \$170.9 billion of ODA disbursed globally, \$68.4 billion were in grants and \$102.5 billion in loans.** Loans represented an estimated 60 percent of total disbursements.
- **Of the ODA disbursed globally, \$15.2 billion (8.9 percent) were in the form of grants to partner governments.**


The majority of disbursed ODA from all donors (bilateral and multilateral)⁸ was provided as public sector loans, accounting for 60% of the total. An additional 16.3% was disbursed to the international private sector.

⁶ The timeframe for the key figures in this report is for the first three years of the global COVID-19 response (2020-2022).

⁷ The 45 countries categorized as “Least Developed Countries” are:
Africa (33): Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia
Asia (8): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Yemen
Caribbean (1): Haiti
Pacific (3): Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu

⁸ The 67 bilateral and multilateral donors that are included in the analysis are: African Dev Bank, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab Fund (AFESD), Asian Development Bank, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Caribbean Development Bank [CarDB], Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Council of Europe Development Bank, COVID-19 Response and Recovery Multi-Partner Trust Fund [UN COVID-19 MPTF], Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Development Bank of Latin America, Estonia, EU Institutions, Finland, France, Gavi, Germany, Global Environment Facility [GEF], Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Inter-American Development Bank, Ireland, Islamic Development Bank, Israel, Italy, Japan, Joint Sustainable Development Goals Fund [Joint SDG Fund], Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, OPEC Fund for International Development, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UNDP, United Kingdom, United States, WHO, WHO-Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan, World Bank.

Figure 1: Bilateral and Multilateral Donors: COVID-19 ODA Disbursements by Channel 2020-2022⁹



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS in addition to figures provided directly by the World Bank.

The World Bank disbursed a total of \$148 billion, representing 87 percent of the total disbursed. The remaining 13 percent of all COVID-19 global disbursements was provided by donor governments (11.5 percent) and other multilateral institutions (1.9 percent) For a full list of donors please refer to Figure 2 below.

⁹ A “channel” refers to a category of entities that receive funds in the first level of disbursement by a donor. Examples include: partner governments, NGOs, and the private sector. For definitions of the channels of disbursements referred to in this report please refer to Index of Terms.

For donor governments (bilateral donors):

- **Amount of ODA bilateral donors allocated, pledged or publicly announced toward the COVID-19 response globally:** \$44.1 billion
- **Amount of ODA bilateral donors disbursed toward the COVID-19 response globally:** \$19.7 billion or 44.7% of the pledge.
- **Amount of ODA disbursed to the 45 poorest countries in the world categorized as LDCs:** \$3.1 billion or 15.7 percent
- **Amount of ODA disbursed to the g7+ Member States¹⁰:** \$918.9 million or 4.7 percent
- **Of the \$19.7 billion of total disbursed ODA, \$18.4 billion was in grants and \$1.2 billion in public sector loans.** These loans represented 6.2 percent of total disbursements.
- **Public sector grants to partner governments represented 7.6 percent of all disbursements.** The majority of disbursed ODA from bilateral donors were channeled in support of multilaterals (52.5 percent) and what is referred to as “Donor Governments” in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Creditor Reporting System(OECD CRS) (15.2 percent). (Please refer to Figure 2 for further details.)

In addition, foundations pledged a total of \$5.1 billion, of which \$2.3 billion (45.6 percent) was disbursed.

As a separate point of interest, global partnerships were created. Two notable ones were the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator¹¹ and the Pandemic Fund.¹² The

¹⁰ The [g7+](#), established in 2010, is an intergovernmental organization that represents conflict-affected countries and countries in fragility. It obtained observer status at the United Nations in 2019. Member States include: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros Islands, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome e Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Yemen.

¹¹ The ACT-Accelerator was a multilateral collaboration that disbursed to the following ten co-conveners and partner agencies: Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND), Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Global Financing Facility (GFF), Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Medicines Patent Pool (MPP), Therapeutics Accelerator, UNICEF, Unitaaid, and World Health Organization (WHO). Gavi received the most funding with \$12.9 billion according to the [ACT-A Commitment Tracker](#).

¹² The Pandemic Fund will channel its financing through Implementing Entities that will support project implementation. Each proposal must identify at least one Implementing Entity from among the thirteen (13) currently approved Implementing Entities, as listed in the [Operations Manual](#) and [Governance Framework](#). The 13 implementing partners of the COVID-19 Pandemic Fund are: African Development Bank; Asian Development Bank; Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; European Investment Bank; Inter-American Development Bank; International Finance Corporation; World Bank;

ACT Accelerator was launched in April 2020 by the WHO and partners. Its ten partner entities received a total of \$24.2 billion as of June 2023. This funding is reflected in the analysis of the multilateral and public-private partnership funding channels. At the time of writing of this report the ACT-Accelerator Tracker did not provide information on the disbursement of the \$24.2 billion by the individual partner entities.¹³ In addition, the Pandemic Fund created by the World Bank in September 2022 had received \$1.1 billion as of June 2023. The most recent Pandemic Fund report available notes that of the \$1.1 billion, \$5.1 million had been disbursed as of June 2023.¹⁴ Neither mechanism allowed partner governments or regional bodies representing them (such as the African Union) any decision making authority at the time of creation. The ACT-Accelerator's ten co-conveners and partner entities were only international institutions. In the case of the Pandemic Fund, only regional development banks and international institutions were allowed to receive the first level of disbursements.

Two countries serve as illustrations of the impact and consequences of how development assistance is delivered— Haiti and Rwanda. We chose these two countries as they are both part of the set of countries referred to as LDCs - Least Developed Countries - yet the channels through which donors chose to disburse their COVID-19 funding were very different for each country. In the case of the COVID-19 global response, Rwanda received a much higher percentage of ODA categorized as partner government grants than Haiti. (Rwanda received 18.3 percent in partner government grants, whereas Haiti received only 2.6 percent.)

These illustrations highlight the importance of donor alignment with national priorities and the potential benefits of channeling aid through partner country institutions to enhance sustainable development outcomes.

In conclusion, this report provides two concrete recommendations to address the existing gaps in aid delivery in a post-crisis situation:

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; UNICEF; World Health Organization; the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations; Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

¹³ The latest information released by the ACT commitment tracker is available at this link: the [ACT-A Commitment Tracker](#).

¹⁴ "Pandemic Fund Trust Fund Financial Report Prepared by the Trustee," The World Bank Group, June 30, 2023, <https://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/content/dam/fif/funds/pppr/TrusteeReports/PPPR%20Trustee%20Report%20-%2006-30-2023.pdf>. p.4

1. Donor pledges and disbursements must be tracked in any post-crisis situation. The tracking must go beyond disbursement rates, which while critical, are not the full story: A critical metric to any tracking of ODA is the percentage of development assistance that is disbursed in the form of grants to partner governments.
2. Any methodology used for tracking donor funding to partner countries' public sectors needs to carefully distinguish between funds that are in support of the partner country generally, and those that are directly invested in budget support and other government funding structures. This approach reflects international agreements such as the Paris Declaration and the Busan Partnership.

I: Introduction

When it became clear in mid-March 2020 that COVID-19 had the potential to threaten the health and security of billions of people across the globe, the international community began to pledge hundreds of millions of dollars toward the response. Despite these significant pledges and the launch of international initiatives under the overarching theme of “we’re not safe until we are all safe,” there was no system in place to monitor the disbursement and allocation of these funds. Ministers of finance from the world’s poorest nations, classified by the United Nations as “Least Developed Countries” (LDCs), lacked readily available information about the funding pledged for their COVID-19 response. More critically, they lacked data on how much of the pledged funds would reach national and local institutions within their countries. This lack of transparency made it challenging for partner countries to mount an effective and timely national response.

This report provides critical information on the billions of dollars of donor pledges, commitments and disbursements as well as an analysis of whether the funding that was disbursed helped create an environment where partner countries are now better positioned to respond to the next pandemic.

Key questions include:

- How much official development assistance (ODA) did the donors (bilaterals and multilaterals) allocate (or pledge) toward the COVID-19 response globally, and more specifically to the 47 poorest countries in the world categorized as LDCs or the g7+ Member States?¹⁵

¹⁵ Please refer to footnote 7 on p. 5 and footnote 10 on p. 7.

- Of the promised ODA toward COVID-19, what percentage was committed? (i.e., contracts signed) and disbursed (i.e., transferred to partner bank accounts)
- Of the promised and disbursed funds, how much were in grants vs loans?
- Where did the disbursed funds go? (National governments, multilaterals, international NGOs and/or contractors, or national NGOs and/or contractors.)
- Of the disbursed funds, how much was disbursed in the form of grants to strengthen national institutions?
- Did the newly created mechanisms for disbursement of COVID-19 funding (COVID-19 Pandemic Fund and ACT-Accelerator) prioritize giving partner governments a seat at the table for decision making and facilitate investment toward their public sectors?

While the United Nations does track disbursed humanitarian funding through the [United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs](#) (often referred to by its acronym OCHA), there is no existing mechanism that tracks the totality of funds – pledges, commitments and disbursements – towards both the humanitarian and recovery effort in a post-crisis situation. This was evident in past humanitarian crises such as the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa or the 2010 earthquake and cholera outbreak in Haiti that resulted in donors pledging billions of dollars in funding with few mechanisms in place to hold them to account for their promises. At the time of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, former President Clinton and Dr. Paul Farmer of Harvard University led a team at the United Nations – the Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti - that tracked all ODA to Haiti on behalf of the national authorities.¹⁶ The team subsequently tracked all aid to Haiti following the 2010 cholera outbreak, and in 2014, when Paul Farmer was a Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General, they tracked aid toward Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone following the Ebola outbreak. In all these tracking efforts, similar trends emerged: 1) no systems were in place to hold donors to account for the promises they made, 2) a disproportionately low percentage of funding was allocated for the strengthening of public institutions in the form of grants to partner governments. In Haiti, after the 2010 earthquake, for example, less than 10 percent of all donor funding was invested in Haitian institutions and the rest went to international service providers (UN entities, international NGOs and private sector contractors), donors' civil and military entities as well as with the provision of in-kind goods.¹⁷

¹⁶ The United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti (2009-2012) was led by President Clinton. Dr. Paul Farmer was his Deputy Special Envoy. The UN team began tracking all ODA to Haiti in 2009, in response to the 2008 hurricanes in Gonaives.

¹⁷ In January 2020, Paul Farmer established the Science of Implementation Initiative (SII) to build upon the work of President Clinton and his team at the United Nations. SII gathers data, conducts research and provides analysis with the goal of making ODA more effective, equitable, and accountable

The case of Haiti post 2010 earthquake is not unique. Donors often bypass national governments when disbursing their ODA, although they do so in contradiction with international agreements that prioritize investment in local governments and economies. This global conversation began in early 2000s in meetings in Monterrey and Rome before the principle of investing in partner countries was codified as policy in the *2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*¹⁸. In Paris, donors agreed to align their funding with national development plans, channel it through the systems of public institutions, and delink funding from requirements to purchase goods and services from specific countries.¹⁹ These aspirations were reiterated in the *2008 Accra Agenda for Action*²⁰ and yet again in the *2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development*.²¹ Focusing specifically on development assistance to the poorest countries, the *2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*²² included donor commitments to increase the percentage of funding channeled using national procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing and procurement, with specific targets to be set at the country level.²³ The *2011 New Deal* also reevaluated the partnership between donors and partner governments ultimately defining it as one in which donors would accept the risk of engaging in the poorest settings and partner governments would strengthen their financial management systems.²⁴ In 2014 and 2016, high level meetings in Mexico and Kenya, reiterated the aid effectiveness principles agreed to in Paris, Accra and Busan while drawing in a more diverse group of stakeholders that included the private sector.

from the perspective of partner countries. This COVID-19 Tracking Initiative built upon the then work of President Clinton and Dr. Farmer at the United Nations and aims to provide insight into the billions of dollars of donor pledges and disbursements toward the pandemic response. Jehane Sedky and Abbey Gardner were part of President Clinton and Paul Farmer's senior staff at the United Nations.

¹⁸ "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness", OECD Publishing, Paris, 2005, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264098084-en>.

¹⁹ Ibid, para 15, 21 and 31.

²⁰ "Accra Agenda for Action", OECD Publishing, Paris, 2008, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264098107-en>. para 12, 15 and 18.

²¹ "Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation," OECD Publishing, Paris, 2011, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/busan-partnership-for-effective-development-co-operation_54de7baa-en.html. para 11, 18 and 19.

²² "The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States", OECD Publishing, Paris, 2011, [https://one.oecd.org/document/DAC/DAC/INCAF\(2011\)4/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DAC/DAC/INCAF(2011)4/en/pdf).

²³ Ibid. p. 3.

²⁴ Ibid.

Tracking ODA toward the COVID-19 response in a way that reflects the principles agreed to in Paris, Accra and Busan was one of the key objectives of our report. While no mechanisms are in place to do so, there are various platforms that provide invaluable data on ODA, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Creditor Reporting System (OECD CRS) and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IAITI) platforms. However, these are both self-reporting systems, making the data as complete as the donors who participate wish to share. The World Bank – the largest contributor to the COVID-19 response with \$273.8 billion committed and \$148 billion disbursed²⁵ – does not have its COVID-19 data reflected in the OECD CRS and has only partial data reflected in the IAITI COVID-19 Funding Dashboard.²⁶ We worked closely with World Bank colleagues to obtain the most up-to-date information on their pledges, commitments, and disbursements. Without this data, the report would not only be incomplete, it would not capture an estimated 87 percent of all funding toward the COVID-19 global response.

This report focuses on tracking the financial flows of ODA in the form of donor pledges, commitments, and disbursements related to the global COVID-19 response and provides insights into the financial support provided to strengthening of the public sector in the Global South during the pandemic.

The findings of this report reveal critical insights into the disbursement patterns of the global COVID-19 response. Out of the pledged \$207.9 billion, approximately \$170.9 billion was disbursed by the end of 2022, with loans constituting a substantial portion of this amount (an estimated 60 percent). However, only a small fraction of disbursed funds—\$15.2 billion, or 8.9 percent—was allocated directly to public sector grants in partner countries. For some donors such as the United States, the amount of funding allocated to partner countries in the form of grants represents .1 percent of their total COVID-19 portfolio. This disparity highlights a persistent issue: despite substantial

²⁵ • The COVID-19 data reported by the World Bank aligns with the World Bank’s fiscal years, which run from July through June.

- World Bank’s COVID-19 pledged amount was \$150 billion over 15 months (April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2021). There was no target/pledged amount for FY22 (July 2021 – June 2022).
- World Bank’s COVID-19 commitments of \$273.8 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
- World Bank’s COVID-19 disbursements of \$148 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
- Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS in addition to figures provided directly by the World Bank.

²⁶ The IAITI COVID-19 Funding Dashboard stopped tracking COVID-19 funding on 4/24/2023. At that time, the [World Bank](#) commitments were at \$54.2 billion and disbursements at \$22 billion and the [World Bank Trust Funds](#) showed a disbursement of \$42.2 million.

financial commitments, the investments in the form of grants to strengthen local and national institutions remain insufficient, reflecting a trend seen in previous crises such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2014 Ebola outbreak.

II: Limitations

In conducting this comprehensive study on donor commitments and disbursements toward the COVID-19 response, we encountered several limitations and challenges. The following section outlines the key limitations of our research, providing context for the data presented and highlighting areas where further investigation may be required.

Firstly, there was no available comprehensive data on donor pledges. Identifying the pledges for all donors was very challenging, particularly because there was no single international donor pledging conference for COVID-19 (as there was, for example, for the Ebola response with the International Ebola Conference held at the United Nations in New York on July 10, 2015.) As a result, donors announced (and re-announced) their pledges in various fora, over the course of two years. In addition, some donors combined their COVID-19 pledge with other funding for institutions such as Gavi, making it difficult to separate out the COVID-19 pledge. Our team spent many months reviewing press releases and statements issued by donors, media outlets and entities such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) to ensure that the pledge figures we are reporting are accurate and do not reflect any double counting. Because there was no single international pledging conference for COVID-19 development assistance some donors did not feel the pressure to announce a pledge, making it at times difficult for us to assess how effective they were in following through with timely disbursements. In addition, some donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank for example, disbursed much more than the pledge figure we have recorded. Others – such as Portugal- did not have information publicly available regarding any pledges, further complicating our efforts to obtain a global pledge figure. As a result, we feel that while the global pledge figure of \$207.9 billion we obtained provides us with an estimate of the amount of funding donors promised to disburse toward the COVID-19 response it is an area we feel would benefit from further research.

Secondly, it may be difficult to replicate our methods despite our detailing each step in the methods section below. We disaggregated the OECD CRS data to provide more clarity regarding what modalities of disbursements the donors used. In doing so, we spent a considerable amount of time and a complicated exercise including creating a new database from raw data to analyze the OECD CRS, in particular how the data is categorized in various channels of disbursements. One of the critical aspects of this

report is that it tracks donor funding with emphasis placed on how much funding ends up in the bank accounts of national and local entities in partner countries. With this in mind, we placed emphasis on how much funding was channeled toward the public sector in partner countries. The reclassification of some channels of the OECD CRS was critical to the findings – we intentionally separated out the “public sector” channel of the OECD CRS to highlight how much funding ended up in partner countries in the form of grants and loans.

In addition, key data on commitments and disbursements was missing from publicly available data sources. After several months of research and consultation with colleagues at the OECD, we decided to use their CRS data on public and private donor commitments and disbursements toward the COVID-19 response. While the OECD CRS data was invaluable, it lacked information on commitments and disbursements from the largest donor to the COVID-19 response – the World Bank. We subsequently reached out to our counterparts at the World Bank to obtain their figures for pledges, commitments and disbursements toward the global COVID-19 response and, more specifically, the World Bank’s support to the countries categorized as LDCs by the United Nations.²⁷ This effort - of working directly with the World Bank - took many months as we requested detailed information, including the modalities of their disbursements. Once we received the data from our World Bank colleagues we saw that the World Bank represents an estimated 87 percent of all global COVID-19 funding and 89.5 percent of all funding toward the LDCs.²⁸ (While the World Bank provided us with all data related to its global and LDC disbursements it was unable to provide us with the same breakdown for the G7+ Member States.)

Finally, another limitation is that the data is not timely. This is due to the amount of time it took to obtain the data we were seeking. The reason this is relevant is that real time access to data on donor commitments and disbursements post-crisis is not only necessary for the sake of donor transparency, it is critical for partner countries to be able to plan and oversee funding that is allocated to them. The lack of accurate and timely data highlights a significant gap in accountability from donors towards partner countries, underscoring the need for improved transparency as agreed to in international aid effectiveness agreement.

²⁷ Please refer to footnote 7 on p. 5 and footnote 10 on p. 7.

²⁸ The World Bank disbursed \$148 billion out of the total \$170.9 billion disbursed globally. In the case of disbursement toward the LDCs, the World Bank disbursed \$31.6 billion out of the total disbursed of \$35.3 billion.

III: Methods²⁹

The methods used in this report were designed to ensure that data collection and analysis are systematic and reproducible, facilitating future research. However, reproducing the data requires downloading raw data from the OECD CRS, as our analysis involved reclassifying existing data. This approach provides greater clarity than existing databases (such as the OECD CRS) regarding the allocation of COVID-19 ODA, particularly the proportion directed to the public sector of countries that were recipients of funding countries. The process involved a series of carefully planned steps to collect and, when necessary, reclassify data, ensuring clarity, precision, and replicability throughout the analysis.

The data used in this report comes from the following sources:

- OECD CRS;
- World Bank data that was provided directly to us upon our request (as World Bank contributions to the COVID-19 global response are not reflected in the OECD CRS); and
- News coverage, press releases and public statements from donor entities regarding their COVID-19 pledges in addition to information available on their own websites.

To ensure accuracy in tracking commitments and disbursements, our methodology relied on OECD CRS data for all donors except the World Bank. (The World Bank provided us with their data directly.) The OECD CRS ensures that ODA dollars are not counted twice by excluding bilateral core contributions to multilateral organizations from recipient totals—whether they are countries or regions. This means that when donors like the U.S. government provide core funding to a multilateral organization, such as UNICEF, the OECD counts these funds only once. This approach prevents double counting and provides a clear, accurate view of how ODA is allocated to recipients.³⁰ All figures are denominated in US dollars, which is how they appear in the OECD CRS.

²⁹ Please refer to Annex II for more details on the methodology.

³⁰ "Frequently Asked Questions on Official Development Assistance (ODA)," OECD Publishing, Paris, Last modified July 2024, <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/insights/data-explainers/2024/07/frequently-asked-questions-on-official-development-assistance-oda.html>.

Definitions

Pledged funds: The amount of funding donors publicly announced or noted in publicly available documents for their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Committed (or obligated) funds: The amount of funding for projects that have been approved or agreements/contracts that have been signed or are in the process of being transferred/dispensed.

Disbursed funds: The amount of funding that has been transferred to an implementing partner (e.g., partner government, NGO, multilateral or other non-state service provider).

Partner government or partner country: The government of a country that receives official development assistance.

Channel: A channel refers to a category of entities that receive funds in the first level of disbursement by a donor. Examples include partner governments, NGOs, and the private sector. (All channels used in this report are listed and defined in Annex II.)

Scope

The data in this report includes all COVID-19 ODA (as defined by the OECD CRS) for 2020-2022, which captures the critical first three years of the global response. The data includes ODA grants, loans and equity investments.³¹ Non-ODA flows, such as other official flows (OOF) and private development finance, are not included in our data for bilateral and multilateral donors. The data in the OECD CRS used in this report was from the first three years of the global COVID-19 response (2020-2022).

In addition to ODA flows, we tracked funding pledged and disbursed by foundations, recognizing that while these funds are classified as private development finance and not ODA, they represent a small but important component of the broader COVID-19 response. Foundations were not the focus of our research initiative, but we included their data in a separate category to provide a more comprehensive picture of the funding landscape.

³¹ There was no COVID-19 commitment or disbursement data reported in the OECD CRS for the ODA Equity Investment flow from 2020 to 2022.

Additionally, the report includes data on all COVID-19 ODA earmarked for two groups that represent the poorest countries in the world: LDCs³² and g7+ Member States.³³ Figures for donor commitments and disbursements to these groups were derived using the following methods:

LDCs: The World Bank provided us with its data broken out specifically for this group of countries. For all other donors, we used the OECD data that was also broken out specifically for the LDCs.

g7+: We tagged the 20 countries that are member states of the intergovernmental body, the g7+, within the OECD CRS database to identify commitments and disbursements (excluding the World Bank that did not report its figures to the OECD CRS).

Donors Reviewed in this Report

The data includes pledges, commitments and disbursements for 94 donors, 141 partner countries delivered through 15 channels.

Donors	Partner Countries	Channels	Total Amount Pledged
94 Total Donors (ODA and private development finance)	141	14	\$213 billion
67 ODA Donors	141	14	\$207.9 billion
27 Private Development Finance Donors	n/a	n/a	\$5.1 billion

We included data from 94 donors: 67 bilateral and multilateral donors and 27 private donors. Ninety-three of these donors reported their commitments and disbursements

³² Please refer to footnote 7 on p. 5.

³³ Please refer to footnote 10 on p. 7.

toward COVID-19 to the OECD CRS. The World Bank provided its data directly to us as it did not report its COVID-19 ODA to the OECD CRS.

Of the 27 private donors that do not fall in the bilateral and multilateral ODA category, 25 are philanthropic foundations and funds and two are state-run lottery structures.

See Annex III for more detail.

Donor Pledges

Since there is no platform that consolidates data on donor pledges, all figures in this report are the result of our own research. We identified donor pledges through press releases, donor websites, and news sources, taking careful steps to avoid double-counting. For each pledge, details such as the amount, dates, recipients, and areas of support were cross-checked with information from subsequent press releases, news articles, and website updates.

In some cases, a donor announced multiple pledges, where a later pledge included funding initially promised in an earlier announcement. For example, a donor might first pledge support for LDCs at a conference, followed by a larger pledge for a broader group of partner countries announced at a later date. Donors rarely specify when subsequent pledges include amounts from previous announcements, so verifying each pledge requires in-depth research of donor websites and press releases. When it was unclear whether an announcement was included in a prior, larger pledge, we did not include it in the total pledge amount to ensure that our figures represent conservative estimates.

Additionally, we excluded any pledges that were clearly earmarked for domestic efforts within the U.S. and Europe.

Of the 67 bilateral and multilateral donors for whom we reported pledges, 29 (representing \$204.7 billion, or 98.5 percent of the total) made official pledges announcements or were quoted in the press.³⁴ For 34 of the remaining donors, we used the figure of the donor commitment that was reported to the OECD CRS. We used commitment figures in these cases because pledges for COVID-19 development assistance were not announced, incomplete, or in the case of development banks, pledges included other forms of funding in addition to ODA. Four remaining donors did

³⁴ The data includes only the pledge announcements specifically for the COVID-19 response. It does not include pledges that combine the COVID-19 response with funding for future pandemic preparedness or vaccines for other diseases.

not report their commitments; for these donors, the disbursement figures they reported to the OECD CRS were used instead.³⁵

For the 27 foundations that included their data in the OECD CRS the pledge figures were calculated using the same methodology as the bilaterals and multilaterals.³⁶ We did not include pledges that were publicly announced for US and European domestic efforts.³⁷

See Annex III for more detail.

Analyzing the COVID-19 Data from the OECD CRS

The analysis in this report was designed to identify the pledges donors made toward the COVID-19 response, their subsequent commitments and disbursements towards their pledges, and the channels used to distribute these funds.

Our methodology focuses on distinguishing funding that was disbursed directly to the public sectors of partner countries. In the OECD CRS and similar tracking systems, funds allocated to donor governments' own agencies (such as U.S. government funding

³⁵ For the 34 donors for which a pledge for COVID-19 development assistance was not found, or in the case of development banks, public pledges included other forms of funding in addition to ODA, the figure of the donor's commitment reported to the OECD CRS was used for the pledge. The 34 donors for which the commitment was used are: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab Fund (AFESD), Asian Development Bank, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Caribbean Development Bank [CarDB], Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Council of Europe Development Bank, COVID-19 Response and Recovery Multi-Partner Trust Fund [UN COVID-19 MPTF], Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Development Bank of Latin America, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Inter-American Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, Joint Sustainable Development Goals Fund [Joint SDG Fund], Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Thailand, UNDP, WHO, WHO-Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan. Pledge information gathered for Greece and Hungary was incomplete, therefore, the commitment figure reported in the OECD CRS was used.

For four donors for which a pledge for COVID-19 development assistance was not found and no commitment was reported in the OECD CRS the figure of the donor's disbursement reported to the OECD CRS was used for the pledge. These donors are: African Development Bank, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (Gavi), Global Environment Facility (GEF), and Israel.

³⁶ Pledge announcements were not found for 10 private donors. For these donors, we used the figure of the donor's commitment that was reported to the OECD CRS for the pledge. These donors are Oak Foundation, Omidyar Network Fund, Inc., Arcadia Fund, Swedish Postcode Lottery, Bernard van Leer Foundation, La Caixa Banking Foundation, Laudes Foundation, German Postcode Lottery, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and Jacobs Foundation.

³⁷ The following foundations have distinguished, in publicly available information, their funding for global COVID-19 support and their funding for U.S. and European domestic efforts: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Citi Foundation, Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open Society Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation.

for PEPFAR) are often counted under “public sector support” to partner countries. This report, however, separates “donor government” funding (support retained by donor government agencies) from funding that actually reached partner governments as grants or loans, providing a clearer view of the impact of ODA on partner countries.

For example, our analysis shows that 52 percent of the bilateral donor funding labeled as “public sector funding” in the OECD CRS was allocated to the “Donor Government” sub-channel, not to partner country governments.³⁸

Additionally, we distinguished between loans and grants within the partner government channel to highlight funding that does not add to the debt burden. This approach allows for a clearer understanding of the breakdown between grants and loans, which are often combined into a single figure. For added clarity, we further disaggregated certain categories into smaller subsets.

IV: Findings

COVID-19 Global Response

At the outset of the pandemic, an estimated \$207.9 billion was pledged by bilaterals and multilaterals toward the global COVID-19 response.³⁹ (See Figure 2 below for detailed pledge information by donor.)

Typically, pledges are higher than commitments in part because often the time frame is longer. Because pledge figures are not available for many donors, the disbursement rates against the commitment figures may at times look higher than they might if they had been compared to pledged figures.

While the World Bank’s pledge of \$150 billion is the largest pledge for a single donor - representing 72.1 percent of all pledges - it does not capture the full extent of the World Bank’s commitment (\$273.8 billion) as it only captures promised funding for 15 months (April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2021). Pledge and commitment figures for all other donors include funding announced and agreed upon by donor governments for 2020-2022 and beyond. (See Figure 2 below for further details by donor.)

³⁸ The “Donor Government” sub-channel captures funding that is provided by a donor government to one of its own government agencies.

³⁹ This figure does not include pledges by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (\$20 billion), China (\$5.2 billion), International Monetary Fund (IMF, \$285 billion), and Russia (\$15 million) which total \$310 billion, as they do not have publicly available information on their disbursements and do not report their COVID-19 data into the OECD CRS.

Total COVID-19 pledges, commitments and disbursements from donor governments and multilateral institutions in 2020-2022:

Total pledged: \$207.9 billion

Total committed: \$297.9 billion

Total disbursed by December 2022: \$170.9 billion (82.2 percent of the pledge; 57.4 percent of committed funds)

Total disbursed in the form of public sector loans: \$102.5 billion (60 percent)

Total disbursed to partner governments in the form of grants: \$15.2 billion or 8.9 percent of total disbursed.

Detailed information on the disbursement rate of all donors, in addition to their disbursement in the form of public sector grants to partner countries can be seen in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Bilateral and Multilateral Donors: COVID-19 ODA Pledges, Commitments and Disbursements 2020-2022 (USD Millions)

Donor	Pledges	Commitments	Disbursements	% of Pledge Disbursed	% of Disbursement to Partner Government Grants
World Bank (link to comment)	\$150,000.0 (for 15 months from 4/20-6/21)	\$273,800.0 (for 27 months from 4/20-6/22)	\$148,000.0 (for 27 months from 4/20-6/22)	98.7% of pledge	9.1%
Japan	\$10,907.4	\$2,392.6	\$2,370.5	21.7%	24.0%
United States	\$10,573.2	\$4,945.7	\$4,231.0	40.0%	0.1%
EU Institutions	\$9,910.7	\$2,384.2	\$1,312.3	13.2%	6.5%
Germany	\$6,772.4	\$3,913.2	\$3,840.2	56.7%	1.9%
France	\$2,601.5	\$646.4	\$1,002.7	38.5%	6.4%
Canada	\$2,394.5	\$1,754.7	\$1,692.6	70.7%	0.4%
United Kingdom	\$2,186.70	\$242.9	\$965.2	44.1%	0.1%
Asian Development Bank	\$1,289.5	\$1,289.5	\$1,063.8	82.5%	3.8%
Norway	\$1,245.1	\$610.7	\$442.0	35.5%	0.0%
OPEC Fund for International Development	\$1,200.0	\$98.4	\$26.1	2.2%	0.0%
Switzerland	\$1,048.0	\$198.6	\$194.7	18.6%	27.1%

Italy	\$794.18	\$477.9	\$475.6	59.9%	6.5%
Saudi Arabia	\$782.8	\$450.2	\$450.2	57.5%	14.0%
Sweden	\$665.0	\$153.9	\$226.1	34.0%	0.5%
Korea	\$662.0	\$982.3	\$930.7	140.6%	0.0%
Spain	\$598.4	\$611.0	\$606.7	101.4%	4.1%
Arab Fund (AFESD)	\$420.2	\$420.2	\$47.6	11.3%	31.4%
Turkey	\$417.0	\$41.1	\$41.1	9.9%	0.0%
Australia	\$410.1	\$626.0	\$625.9	152.6%	14.3%
Netherlands	\$390.5	\$145.1	\$141.1	36.1%	0.2%
Poland	\$270.7	\$69.8	\$69.9	25.8%	0.0%
Gavi	\$241.6	\$0.0	\$241.6	100.0%	0.0%
New Zealand	\$233.8	\$124.6	\$111.3	47.6%	11.8%
WHO-Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan	\$200.6	\$200.6	\$200.6	100.0%	0.0%
Central American Bank for Economic Integration	\$156.6	\$156.6	\$69.2	44.2%	7.9%
Kuwait	\$154.0	\$0.0	\$10.0	6.5%	0.0%
Islamic Development Bank	\$124.1	\$124.1	\$21.5	17.3%	13.6%
Hungary	\$103.7	\$103.7	\$103.7	100.0%	0.0%
Denmark	\$94.1	\$136.4	\$141.0	149.8%	0.0%
Luxembourg	\$94.1	\$11.7	\$11.7	12.7%	0.0%
Ireland	\$88.6	\$82.0	\$82.0	92.3%	4.0%
Belgium	\$87.9	\$69.2	\$69.2	78.7%	75.5%
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	\$84.1	\$84.1	\$0.0	0.0%	0.0%
Council of Europe Development Bank	\$70.2	\$70.2	\$41.2	58.8%	0.0%
Portugal	\$51.5	\$51.5	\$51.5	100.0%	0.6%
Austria	\$50.5	\$67.9	\$67.8	134.4%	27.5%
UAE	\$50.0	\$11.8	\$380.3	760.5%	93.5%
Greece	\$49.4	\$49.4	\$49.4	100.0%	41.2%
UNDP	\$38.9	\$38.9	\$38.9	100.0%	5.6%
Finland	\$38.7	\$38.7	\$28.8	74.4%	0.0%
Croatia	\$38.3	\$38.3	\$38.2	100.0%	62.9%
Slovak Republic	\$28.5	\$28.5	\$28.5	99.9%	1.6%
Czechia	\$23.5	\$23.5	\$23.2	98.8%	23.0%
Azerbaijan	\$23.3	\$23.3	\$23.3	100.0%	0.0%
Slovenia	\$22.5	\$22.5	\$17.4	77.5%	0.0%

WHO	\$22.0	\$22.0	\$22.0	100.0%	0.0%
Global Environment Facility [GEF]	\$21.8	\$0.0	\$21.8	100.0%	0.0%
Bulgaria	\$20.8	\$20.8	\$20.8	100.0%	0.1%
Qatar	\$20.0	\$7.5	\$77.0	385.1%	8.3%
Caribbean Development Bank [CarDB]	\$19.2	\$19.2	\$0.3	1.4%	0.0%
African Dev Bank	\$15.4	\$0.0	\$15.4	100.0%	100.0%
Iceland	\$14.6	\$14.6	\$14.6	100.0%	8.1%
Romania	\$14.4	\$14.4	\$14.4	100.0%	0.0%
Latvia	\$11.5	\$11.5	\$11.5	100.0%	90.5%
Lithuania	\$6.2	\$6.2	\$6.2	100.0%	84.7%
Thailand	\$5.7	\$5.7	\$5.7	100.0%	100.0%
Estonia	\$3.3	\$3.3	\$3.4	102.3%	10.4%
COVID-19 Response and Recovery Multi-Partner Trust Fund [UN COVID-19 MPTF]	\$2.7	\$2.7	\$2.7	100.0%	0.0%
Malta	\$1.5	\$1.5	\$4.3	285.1%	0.0%
Inter-American Development Bank	\$0.8	\$0.8	\$35.5	4440.8%	1.2%
Monaco	\$0.7	\$0.7	\$0.7	100.0%	100.0%
Liechtenstein	\$0.6	\$0.6	\$0.6	100.0%	0.0%
Cyprus	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3	100.0%	0.0%
Joint Sustainable Development Goals Fund [Joint SDG Fund]	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.1	100.0%	0.0%
Israel	\$0.1	\$0.0	\$0.1	100.0%	0.0%
Development Bank of Latin America	\$0.03	\$0.03	\$0.0	0.0%	0.0%
Total	\$207,870.5	\$297,944.1	\$170,864.0	82.2%	8.9%

Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS in addition to figures provided directly by the World Bank. For the 34 donors for which a pledge for COVID-19 development assistance was not found, or in the case of development banks, public pledges included other forms of funding in addition to ODA, the figure of the donor's commitment reported to the OECD CRS was used for the pledge. The 34 donors for which the commitment was used are: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab Fund (AFESD), Asian Development Bank, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Caribbean Development Bank [CarDB], Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Council of Europe Development Bank, COVID-19 Response and Recovery Multi-Partner Trust Fund [UN COVID-19 MPTF], Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Development Bank of Latin America, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Inter-American Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, Joint Sustainable Development Goals Fund [Joint SDG Fund], Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Thailand, UNDP, WHO, WHO Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan. Pledge information gathered for Greece and Hungary was incomplete, therefore, the commitment figure reported in the OECD CRS was used.

For four donors for which a pledge for COVID-19 development assistance was not found and no commitment was reported in the OECD CRS the figure of the donor's disbursement reported to the OECD CRS was used for the pledge. These donors are: African Development Bank, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (Gavi), Global Environment Facility (GEF), and Israel.

In addition, foundations, lottery funds and other private funds pledged a total of \$5.1 billion of which \$2.3 billion (45.6 percent) was disbursed.


Figure 3: Private Donor COVID-19 Pledges, Commitments and Disbursements 2020-2022 (USD Millions)

Donor	Pledge	% of Total Pledge	Commitment (2020- 2022)	Disbursement (2020-2022)	% of Pledge Disbursed
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	\$1,985.0	39.1%	\$996.5	\$942.9	47.5%
Mastercard Foundation	\$1,340.0	26.4%	\$1,249.7	\$975.0	72.8%
Rockefeller Foundation	\$947.0	18.6%	\$95.8	\$82.0	8.7%
Wellcome Trust	\$162.3	3.2%	\$158.4	\$158.4	97.6%
LEGO Foundation	\$150.0	3.0%	\$10.5	\$8.9	5.9%
Open Society Foundations	\$145.5	2.9%	\$14.7	\$14.7	10.1%
Michael & Susan Dell Foundation	\$100.0	2.0%	\$29.5	\$29.5	29.5%
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation	\$82.0	1.6%	\$23.6	\$11.1	13.5%
Bloomberg Family Foundation	\$50.0	1.0%	\$7.6	\$7.6	15.3%
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	\$41.3	0.8%	\$23.7	\$23.7	57.3%
Citi Foundation	\$38.4	0.1%	\$7.4	\$7.4	147.6%
UBS Optimus Foundation	\$34.0	0.1%	\$5.2	\$5.1	98.4%
Fondation Botnar	\$17.7	0.3%	\$16.8	\$16.8	95.3%
Ford Foundation	\$16.0	0.3%	\$17.6	\$15.7	97.9%
IKEA Foundation	\$14.1	0.3%	\$12.7	\$12.8	91.0%
Conrad N. Hilton Foundation	\$12.8	0.3%	\$28.5	\$28.5	222.4%
Oak Foundation	\$2.03	0.0%	\$2.0	\$2.0	100.0%
Omidyar Network Fund, Inc.	\$1.2	0.0%	\$1.2	\$1.2	100.0%
H&M Foundation	\$0.53	0.0%	\$0.5	\$0.5	106.6%
Arcadia Fund	\$0.50	0.0%	\$0.5	\$0.5	100.0%
Swedish Postcode Lottery	\$0.28	0.0%	\$0.3	\$0.3	100.0%
Bernard van Leer Foundation	\$0.24	0.0%	\$0.2	\$0.2	100.0%
La Caixa Banking Foundation	\$0.17	0.0%	\$0.2	\$0.2	100.0%

Laudes Foundation	\$0.14	0.0%	\$0.1	\$0.1	100.0%
German Postcode Lottery	\$0.12	0.0%	\$0.1	\$0.1	100.0%
Carnegie Corporation of New York	\$0.10	0.0%	\$0.1	\$0.1	100.0%
Jacobs Foundation	\$0.003	\$0.000	\$0.003	\$0.003	100.0%
Total	\$5,141.3		\$2,703.5	\$2,345.2	45.6%

Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS For 20 private donors that made public pledges either through press reports, press releases or on their websites, the pledged amounts were used. Amounts directed towards U.S. domestic and European efforts were subtracted wherever possible. For the 10 private donors for which we were unable to find a public pledge, the commitments reported in the OECD CRS for the pledge amounts were used. These donors are Oak Foundation, Omidyar Network Fund, Inc., Arcadia Fund, Swedish Postcode Lottery, Bernard van Leer Foundation, La Caixa Banking Foundation, Laudes Foundation, German Postcode Lottery, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and Jacobs Foundation.


Figure 4: Bilateral and Multilateral Donors: Global COVID-19 ODA Commitments and Disbursements 2020-2022



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS in addition to figures provided directly by the World Bank.

The World Bank disbursement of \$148 billion constitutes 87 percent of the total global disbursement figure.

Figure 5: World Bank vs. Bilateral and Multilateral Donors: Global COVID-19 ODA Disbursements 2020-2022




Notes:

1. The COVID-19 data reported by the World Bank aligns with the World Bank’s fiscal years, which run from July through June.
2. World Bank COVID-19 pledged amount was \$150 billion over 15 months (April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2021). There was no target/pledged amount for FY22 (July 2021 – June 2022).
3. World Bank COVID-19 commitments of \$273.8 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
4. World Bank COVID-19 disbursements of \$148 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
5. Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS in addition to figures provided directly by the World Bank.

Of the \$148 billion disbursed by the World Bank, an estimated \$99.5 billion (67.2 percent) was in the form of public sector loans, and \$13.5 billion (9.1 percent) was in the form of grants to partner governments.

Figure 6: World Bank: Global COVID-19 ODA Disbursements by Channel 2020-2022




Notes:

1. The COVID-19 data reported by the World Bank aligns with the World Bank’s fiscal years, which run from July through June.
2. World Bank COVID-19 pledged amount was \$150 billion over 15 months (April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2021). There was no target/pledged amount for FY22 (July 2021 – June 2022).
3. World Bank COVID-19 commitments of \$273.8 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
4. World Bank COVID-19 disbursements of \$148 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.

For further information on the World Bank’s disbursement, please see Annex IV.

Without the World Bank’s disbursement, the total disbursement of donor governments and multilateral institutions toward the global COVID-19 response stands at \$22.9 billion or 13.4 percent of all disbursements.


Figure 7: Bilateral and Multilateral Donors without World Bank: Global COVID-19 ODA Disbursements Pledges and Disbursements 2020-2022



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS.

The disbursement of multilaterals including the World Bank amounts to \$151.2 billion or 72.7 percent of all pledges.

Figure 8: Multilateral Donors: Global COVID-19 ODA Pledges, Commitments and Disbursements 2020-2022




Notes:

1. The COVID-19 data reported by the World Bank aligns with the World Bank’s fiscal years, which run from July through June.
2. World Bank COVID-19 pledged amount was \$150 billion over 15 months (April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2021). There was no target/pledged amount for FY22 (July 2021 – June 2022).
3. World Bank COVID-19 commitments of \$273.8 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
4. World Bank COVID-19 disbursements of \$148 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
5. Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS in addition to figures provided directly by the World Bank.


The disbursement of government (bilateral) donors amounted to \$19.7 billion (11.5 percent of the total disbursement from all bilateral and multilateral donors, which include the World Bank figures). The bilateral donors disbursed 44.7 percent of their own \$44.1 billion pledge. Figures 9 and 10 below show the breakdown of pledges, commitments and disbursements of donor governments as well as the channels they used for disbursement.

Figure 9: Bilateral Donors: Global COVID-19 ODA Pledges, Commitments and Disbursements 2020-2022



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS.


Figure 10: Bilateral Donors: Global COVID-19 ODA Disbursements by Channel 2020-2022



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS.

The U.S. government was the largest bilateral donor, with \$10.6 billion pledged and \$4.2 billion disbursed - an estimated 40 percent of its pledge. **Of the total \$4.2 billion disbursed by the U.S., \$3.2 million (.1 percent) went toward partner government grants.** The U.S. government’s disbursement channels were as follows:

Figure 11: United States: Global COVID-19 ODA Disbursements by Channel 2020-2022



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS.

Focus on LDCs and g7+ Member States⁴⁰

A. Least Developed Countries⁴¹

Of the \$170.9 billion disbursed toward COVID-19 globally by donor governments and multilateral institutions in 2020 -2022, **\$35.3 billion (or 21 percent) went toward the LDCs.**⁴²

The analysis of the total funding toward the LDCs showed that an estimated 55.9 percent of all donor funding disbursed was in the form of loans. The remaining funding mostly went to partner government grants (36.9 percent), multilateral agencies (3.4 percent) and NGOs (1.4 percent). Since 89.5 percent of this funding came from the World Bank, these percentages largely reflect the World Bank's disbursement channels. The percentage of total direct funding toward partner government grants (36.9 percent) was higher than the corresponding figure for all countries combined (8.8 percent). This is largely due to the fact that World Bank funding toward LDCs included \$ 12.6 billion toward partner government grants, representing 40 percent of the total ODA disbursed toward LDCs.


⁴⁰ Please refer to footnote 7 on p. 5 and footnote 10 on p. 7.

⁴¹ Please refer to footnote 7 on p. 5.

⁴² Donors have committed an estimated \$58.3 billion for the LDCs.

Bilateral and multilateral donors used the following channels to disburse their ODA to the LDCs:


Figure 12: Bilateral and Multilateral Disbursements to LDCs by Channel 2020-2022



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS in addition to figures provided directly by the World Bank.

The World Bank alone disbursed \$31.6 billion, representing 89.5 percent of the total amount disbursed. The \$31.6 billion disbursed by the World Bank was disbursed through the following channels:

Figure 13: World Bank: COVID-19 ODA Disbursements to LDCs by Channel 2020-2022



Notes:

1. The COVID-19 data reported by the World Bank aligns with the World Bank’s fiscal years, which run from July through June.
2. World Bank COVID-19 pledged amount was \$150 billion over 15 months (April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2021). There was no target/pledged amount for FY22 (July 2021 – June 2022).
3. World Bank COVID-19 commitments of \$273.8 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
4. World Bank COVID-19 disbursements of \$148 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.

When the World Bank’s disbursements are removed from the total donor disbursement figures for the LDCs, a different picture emerges: bilateral donors and multilateral institutions such as EU institutions and regional development banks disbursed a total of \$3.7 billion – with multilateral implementing partners receiving the most funding (32 percent), followed by loans (20 percent). Partner governments only received 11 percent of funding in the form of grants from bilateral donors.

B. g7+ Member States⁴³


Our analysis shows that **of the \$22.9 billion disbursed** toward COVID-19 globally by donor governments and multilateral institutions in 2020 -2022, \$972 million (or 4.2 percent) went to the g7+ Member States. While we were able to obtain a breakdown of the World Bank's COVID-19 contributions towards the LDCs we were unable to obtain a breakdown by channel for the g7+ member states.

Excluding World Bank disbursements, \$972 million was disbursed to the g7+ member states. Of that total, \$96 million (or 9.8 percent) was provided to partner governments in the form of grants.

⁴³ Please refer to footnote 10 on p. 7.

The international community (excluding the World Bank) used the following channels to disburse its resources to the g7+:

Figure 14: g7+ Member States: Global COVID-19 ODA Disbursements by Channel (excluding World Bank) 2020-2022



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS.

Haiti and Rwanda

We chose to compare Haiti and Rwanda as a way of illustrating contrasting approaches to ODA and the resulting impacts on public sector strengthening.

Haiti represents a country where donors frequently bypass the public sector, resulting in limited strengthening of national institutions. After the 2010 earthquake, an analysis conducted by President Clinton and Paul Farmer’s UN Special Envoy on Haiti office revealed that 90 percent of ODA to Haiti did not stay within the country or support

Haitian institutions, illustrating a missed opportunity for sustainable development and capacity building.⁴⁴ The remaining 10 percent went toward the Haitian government. Haitian NGOs received .6 percent of all ODA to Haiti post-2010 earthquake. Haiti continues to receive very low funding toward its budget support (approximately 6.1 percent) which has aggravated its already vulnerable socio-economic conditions.⁴⁵

While the urgency of a humanitarian emergency prioritizes immediate aid delivery over long-term capacity building, national institutions need to be an integral part of any response to manage the crisis and deploy resources strategically. Strengthening national institutions is also key for preparation against future pandemics and health crises. Effective emergency response and support for strengthening national institutions are not mutually exclusive; both can and should be pursued simultaneously to ensure immediate intervention and long-term functioning public health systems.

The Haiti Reconstruction Fund⁴⁶ - created in April 2010 after the earthquake in Haiti - was a missed opportunity to strengthen the public sector – it could only disburse to three multilateral institutions: the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations and the World Bank. These organizations functioned as intermediaries, often adding cost, delaying realization of projects, detracting from ownership by Haitians, and making it complicated for Haitian institutions to access funds. While donors understandably are concerned about fiduciary risk these design characteristics of financial disbursement systems often come with serious opportunity costs.

Conversely, Rwanda exemplifies how strong country leadership and strategic policies on ODA can lead to significant investment in the public sector.⁴⁷ Rwanda has implemented policies that ensure ODA is aligned with its national development plans, resulting in higher levels of investment in public sector institutions and budget support.⁴⁸ This strategic alignment has made Rwanda one of the LDC countries with higher levels

⁴⁴ United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, New York, November 2012, “Can More Aid Stay in Haiti and Other Fragile Settings?,” p.8, <https://siidata.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/lessonsfromhaiti/osereport2012.pdf>.

⁴⁵ Analysis conducted by the Science of Implementation team using 2013-2022 data from the OECD CRS.

⁴⁶ The Haiti Reconstruction Fund was a World Bank pooled fund created in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake to help finance post-earthquake reconstruction. <https://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/>.

⁴⁷ Paul Farmer, Cameron Nutt, and Claire Wagner, “Reduced Premature Mortality in Rwanda: Lessons from Success,” *British Medical Journal*, January 2013.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

of donor investment in its public sector, showcasing the benefits of strong national leadership and policy coherence in maximizing the impact of ODA.⁴⁹ For example, over the last 20 years, Rwanda, which received 56 percent of its ODA through national systems, has posted some of the strongest development progress ever documented.⁵⁰

Rwanda historically receives a significantly higher proportion of ODA through budget support (approximately 22.9 percent) compared to Haiti (approximately 6.1 percent). For COVID-19 funding, Rwanda received 18.3 percent of total funding earmarked for its recovery through partner government grants, while Haiti received only 2.6 percent.⁵¹ These patterns are consistent with their overall ODA trends and their ability to make progress toward achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Rwanda was 52.89 percent on track to meet the SDGs in 2010 and by 2019 it was 59.13 percent on track, reflecting a progress rate over nine years of 13.29 percent. In contrast, Haiti was 48.9 percent on track to meet the SDGs in 2010 and by 2019 was 52.3 percent on track, a lower progress rate of 6.95 percent over the same nine years.⁵²


⁴⁹ Percentage of ODA channeled through country systems based on estimates of the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Community Based Health and Aid Delivery and from the OECD's Paris Declaration Survey and the OECD's CRS.

⁵⁰ Paul Farmer, Cameron Nutt, and Claire Wagner. "Reduced Premature Mortality in Rwanda: Lessons from Success," *British Medical Journal*, January 2013.

⁵¹ Percentage of ODA channeled through the public sector for Haiti is based on data from the OECD CRS for 2020, 2021, and 2022.


⁵² For more information on Haiti and Rwanda's ability to achieve the UN SDGs, please refer to: <https://dashboards.sdqindex.org/profiles>. Data from the tracker available at: Sachs, J.D., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G., Drumm, E. (2023). *Implementing the SDG Stimulus. Sustainable Development Report 2023*. Paris: SDSN, Dublin: Dublin University Press, 2023.

Figure 15: Haiti: Global COVID-19 ODA Disbursements without World Bank Received by Channel 2020-2022



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS.

Figure 16: Rwanda: Global COVID-19 ODA Disbursements without World Bank Received by Channel 2020-2022



Note: Analysis includes data from the OECD CRS.

Part V: Discussion

When evaluating the effectiveness of COVID-19 ODA, it is essential to consider not just the disbursement rates but also where the funds were disbursed. Although the average disbursement rate for all donors was 82 percent, this figure is high because of the significant impact of the World Bank's high disbursement rate. The World Bank alone, with a disbursement rate of 98.7 percent, accounts for 86.6 percent of the total disbursements.

To provide a clearer picture, we can categorize donors based on the size of their contributions and their disbursement rates.

Donors disbursing over \$2.0 billion

World Bank: \$148 billion disbursed, 98.7 percent of pledges.

United States: \$4.23 billion disbursed, 40.0 percent of pledges.

Germany: \$3.84 billion disbursed, 56.7 percent of pledges.

Japan: \$2.37 billion disbursed, 21.7 percent of pledges.

Donors disbursing \$1.0 billion - \$1.9 billion

Canada: \$1.69 billion disbursed, 70.7 percent of pledges.

EU Institutions: \$1.31 billion disbursed, 13.2% of pledges.

Asian Development Bank: \$1.06 billion disbursed, 82.5% of pledges.

France: \$1 billion disbursed, 38.5% of pledges.

Donors disbursing under \$1.0 billion

United Kingdom: \$965 million disbursed, 44.1% of pledges.

Saudi Arabia: \$450 million disbursed, 57.5% of pledges.

Norway: \$442 million disbursed, 35.5% of pledges.

Switzerland: \$195 million disbursed, 18.6% of pledges.

Bilateral Donors (combined) total of \$19.7 billion.

Bilateral donors collectively disbursed at an average rate of 44.7%. The United States, specifically, has a disbursement rate of 40%.

While high disbursement rates are critical for partner governments, it is crucial to assess how these funds were channeled. This analysis underscores the necessity to look beyond the average disbursement rate and focus on how and where the funds were utilized.

Of the total \$19.7 billion disbursed by the bilaterals only 7.6 percent (or \$1.5 billion) was in the form of partner government grants. The World Bank disbursed 9.1 percent of its funds as grants to partner governments. The US government's disbursements to partner government grants totaled .1 percent with a total of \$3.2 million. The percentage of funding allocated toward partner government grants is important when looking at whether donor disbursements were effective in strengthening the public sector in the countries they are supporting.

Our illustrations of Haiti and Rwanda - both countries categorized as LDCs - showed similar trends - although Rwanda had a much higher rate of disbursements in the form of grants to the public sector (18.3 percent as compared to 2.6 percent for Haiti). The relatively high percentage to the public sector in Rwanda is in great part due to the fact that Rwanda has - since the creation of its Vision 2020 in 2000 - required that donors align their funding with their national plans and disburse as much as possible through their national institutions.⁵³

The story of COVID-19 donor disbursements is not unique; in fact it is similar to donor behavior in the aftermath of past crises. The trends are similar: very little funding ends up in the form of budget support, partner government grants or is channeled using national systems.

For example, Liberia only received three percent of its ODA through national systems prior to the Ebola outbreak.⁵⁴ Instead, most of the aid was funneled through international NGOs and contractors, bypassing the public sector and failing to build permanent institutions or strengthen the national healthcare workforce. Consequently, when Ebola struck, it led to a devastating epidemic with high fatality rates as there were no robust public health systems in place to protect the population.

The lack of investment in public health systems significantly weakened the response to the Ebola outbreak. The authors of a JAMA article titled "The Ebola Outbreak, Fragile Health Systems, and Quality as a Cure" argue that the inability to contain the spread, as well as the high fatality rates, should not be attributed only to the virulence of the virus but rather to the lack of investment in the public health infrastructure and workforce. The low ratio of healthcare workers to the population in Liberia, with only 51 physicians serving 4.3 million people, resulted from years of underinvestment in human resources for health in the country.⁵⁵ Dr. Paul Farmer from Harvard University summarized this issue in the London Review of Books, stating, "...weak health systems, not unprecedented virulence or a previously unknown mode of transmission, are to blame

⁵³ "Rwanda Vision 2020," Republic of Rwanda, Revised 2012, https://climatechange.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/Report/RwandaVision2020.pdf.

⁵⁴ "Key Principles on COVID-19 Response," Science of Implementation Initiative, <https://siidata.org/key-principles-on-covid-19-response/>.

⁵⁵ AS Boozary, PE Farmer, AK Jha, "The Ebola Outbreak, Fragile Health Systems, and Quality as a Cure," *JAMA Network*, 11/12/ 2014, <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/1915433>.

for Ebola's rapid spread. Weak health systems are also to blame for the high case-fatality rates in the current pandemic, which is caused by the Zaire strain of the virus."⁵⁶

The Ebola epidemic exposed the systemic problem of bypassing long-term investment in national institutions. The inadequacy of health systems meant patients were often quarantined in facilities with few resources where they received minimal care leading to exceptionally high fatality rates. The lack of high-quality care led to a loss of trust in the health system, resulting in sick people avoiding the Ebola treatment centers, further exacerbating the crisis.

In the case of COVID-19 similar trends can be seen with the low levels of investment in public sector grants. The data shows that while a significant amount of loans were granted, only a small portion of the global response was disbursed as grants to support and strengthen national and local institutions. Out of the total \$170.9 billion disbursed, only 8.9 percent (or \$15.2 billion) was provided as partner government grants. While loans, especially the World Bank's IDA loans, are important, ODA in the form of grants to partner governments allows them to invest and strengthen their health and social sectors without the burden of servicing debt.

While the World Bank's IDA loans for countries categorized as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) often come with very low or zero percent interest rates, they come with several hidden burdens. For example, the administrative burden of meeting loan requirements can strain the limited bureaucratic capacities of poor countries, diverting resources from other priorities. Even though IDA loans are highly concessional and flexible, they still contribute to long-term debt accumulation, which can become unsustainable if economic growth does not keep pace with debt obligations. Project implementation risks, such weak capacity, can lead to unintended consequences such as debt without corresponding economic benefits. In addition, repayments in foreign currencies can be costly if the local currency depreciates.⁵⁷

As partner countries in resource poor settings need to service their debt they are often faced with the difficult choice of prioritizing debt servicing over crucial investments in health and education. As a result, countries categorized as HIPC by the World Bank have higher rates of infant mortality, disease, illiteracy and malnutrition compared to their counterparts in the developing world. Today, 3.3 billion people - including those living on the African continent - inhabit countries whose expenditure on interest

⁵⁶ PE Farmer, "Ebola," London Review of Books, 10/23/2014, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v36/n20/paul-farmer/diary>.

⁵⁷ "A World of Debt, Report 2024," UNCTAD, 2024, <https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt>.

payments surpass allocations toward health and education. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the debt burden, especially for the poorest countries. In 2020, the external debt service for the LDCs amounted to \$31 billion, with projections indicating a substantial increase to \$50 billion for both 2021 and 2022.⁵⁸ A recent Oxfam analysis revealed that “half of IDA-eligible countries are overindebted and need nearly half (45 percent) of their debt cancelled.”⁵⁹

Bilateral donors did not provide a large percentage of COVID-19 funding in the form of loans (6.2 percent). The majority of their funding was channeled through multilateral institutions (\$10.3 billion or 52.5 percent) and to their own agencies (\$3 billion or 15.2 percent). A similar missed opportunity to strengthen the public sector – in particular health systems – is evident here with the lack of direct funding from bilateral donors to partner governments in the form of grants.

Another effective manner of strengthening the public sector is through the use of pooled funds that have the capacity to disburse directly to national and local institutions. A pooled fund can ensure coordination, government involvement, transparency and alignment with national plans and priorities. Yet, the pooled funds and global mechanisms that were created in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic - including the Pandemic Fund (operated by the World Bank) and the ACT Accelerator- did not provide partner governments a seat at the table. The Pandemic Fund did not disburse directly to national institutions. It disbursed funding to 13 different international entities and development banks. The ACT Accelerator – which received \$24.2 billion from donors – was a consortium that only included ten international institutions as co-conveners and partner agencies. While these institutions could disburse to partner governments the first level of contributions and decisions excluded partner countries and regional bodies such as the African Union.⁶⁰ In both these cases, partner countries would need to seek funding from one of the international recipient organizations, which adds costs, months of delays in some cases, and hinders the partner country’s ability to

⁵⁸ “A World of Debt, Report 2024,” UNCTAD, 2024, <https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt>.

⁵⁹ “Income Inequality High or Rising in 60 Percent of Countries with loans from IMF and World Bank,” OXFAM International, 4/15/2024, <https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/income-inequality-high-or-rising-60-percent-countries-loans-imf-and-world-bank>.

⁶⁰ Please refer to footnote 12 on p. 7 for the 13 international entities that receive funding from the Pandemic Fund and to footnote 11 on p. 7 for the ACT Accelerator co-conveners and partner agencies. Gavi received the most funding with \$12.9 billion according to the [ACT-A Commitment Tracker](#). “Access to COVID-19 tools funding commitment tracker,” World Health Organization, June 1, 2023, <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/access-to-covid-19-tools-tracker>.

coordinate and oversee available resources allocated toward COVID-19 recovery efforts.

Global pooled funds such as the COVID-19 Pandemic Fund (operated by the World Bank) did not allow for any countries in Africa to receive funding directly. The affected countries needed to apply for funding from one of 13 international entities or regional development banks. This process incurs additional costs (in overhead and fees) and time.⁶¹ The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, which has an African Union-mandated role of convenor and coordinator of health was not accredited by the COVID-19 Pandemic Fund to be an implementing partner. In fact, in February 2023 the Africa CDC issued a statement welcoming the Pandemic Fund and encouraging its member states to participate in its activities. The statement is also very clear in noting that the Africa CDC should have more than an “observer role”. Relevant paragraphs include:

“Africa CDC is convinced that the New Public Health Order brings the changes necessary for improved global preparedness and response to disease threats and health emergencies. One key aspect is regional strategies and action, based on mandates of regional institutions like Africa CDC. However, Africa CDC has not yet been accredited by the Pandemic Fund to be an Implementing Entity (IE) [2]. This has considerably constrained the ability of Africa CDC, in the context of the Pandemic Fund, to play its AU-mandated role as convenor and coordinator of health security in Africa.

To this end, Africa CDC is unable to participate in the first call for EOIs, indeed the First Call for Proposals as well. By its mandate, Africa CDC will await the outcome of the request to be an Implementing Entity so that it can play its rightful role of being a convenor and coordinator for health security in Africa.”⁶²

When bilateral donors and their implementing NGO partners opt to disregard the commitments they made in international aid effectiveness agreements and bypass public systems, poor countries are dealt a triple blow. First, their essential sectors, such as public health, education, and infrastructure, suffer from insufficient investment and support. Second, a damaging narrative is perpetuated that assigns blame to national authorities for the absence of investments, thus eroding trust and the social contract in aid-reliant countries. Third, this erosion of trust frequently results in economic, social, and political instability.

⁶¹ Please refer to footnote 12 on p. 7 for the 13 international entities that receive funding from the Pandemic Fund.

⁶² For further information, please refer to the statement by the Africa CDC available [here](https://africacdc.org/news-item/statement-from-africa-cdc-on-the-pandemic-fund1/). “Statement from Africa CDC on the Pandemic Fund,” Africa CDC, February 15, 2023, <https://africacdc.org/news-item/statement-from-africa-cdc-on-the-pandemic-fund1/>.

At present, and with the COVID-19 pandemic response, (even before the dismantling of USAID) we are seeing a reversal in internationally agreed-upon agreements where donors are increasingly bypassing national and local institutions. In fact, an estimated 85.8 percent of all ODA never reaches partner governments in the form of budget support.⁶³ This is not only a step backward as regards adherence to international agreements, it has a very real impact on the reduction of poverty and disease as studies have shown that direct investment in public sector institutions of partner countries leads to a reduction in poverty and disease over time.⁶⁴

After three years of negotiations, a global pandemic agreement was finally formally adopted by 124 WHO member states at the 78th World Health Assembly in Geneva on May 20, 2025.⁶⁵ The agreement aims to address the inequities exposed during the COVID-19 response, specifically the failure to ensure timely and fair access to vaccines, treatments, and other essential health tools in low and middle-income countries.⁶⁶ It includes a broad set of commitments, ranging from increased investment in research and development and strengthened local manufacturing, to greater transparency in procurement and improved regulatory coordination.⁶⁷

Reaching consensus was difficult, and disagreements persist, particularly over financing questions, as well as intellectual property and technology transfer, with wealthy countries favoring voluntary provisions and low and middle-income countries pushing for binding commitments to ensure equitable access.⁶⁸ The agreement will not take effect until an agreement is reached on a key annex regarding Pathogen Access and

⁶³ Analysis conducted by the Science of Implementation team using 2013-2022 data from the OECD CRS.

⁶⁴ Abbey Gardner, Jehane Sedky, "Changing Development with Data: Using a Scientific Approach to End Poverty and Disease," Science of Implementation, March 2021, <https://siidata.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Changing-Development-with-Data-3-Nov-FINAL.pdf>.

⁶⁵ "World Health Assembly Adopts Historic Pandemic Agreement to Make the World More Equitable and Safer from Future Pandemics," World Health Organization, May 20, 2025. <https://www.who.int/news/item/20-05-2025-world-health-assembly-adopts-historic-pandemic-agreement-to-make-the-world-more-equitable-and-safer-from-future-pandemics>.

⁶⁶ Josh Michaud, Jennifer Kates, and Anna Rouw, "The 'Pandemic Agreement': What it is, What it isn't, and What it Could Mean for the U.S.," KFF, April 1, 2024, updated June 18, 2024. <https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/issue-brief/the-pandemic-agreement-what-it-is-what-it-isnt-and-what-it-could-mean-for-the-u-s/>.

⁶⁷ Global Health Technologies Coalition, Pandemic Agreement Briefer, May 2025. https://www.ghtcoalition.org/documents/pdf/Pandemic%20Agreement%20Briefer_May%202025.pdf.

⁶⁸ Alice Park, "WHO Member States Reach Historic Health Deal, But Challenges Remain," BMJ, May 2025, <https://www.bmj.com/content/389/bmj.r970>.

Benefit-Sharing (PABS), anticipated by May 2026. This annex is intended to ensure that countries contributing pathogen samples “eventually benefit from the tools that they contributed to,” but its terms are still under negotiation.⁶⁹ This lack of agreement and trust highlights the critical need for robust mechanisms to ensure fair resource distribution during pandemics, avoiding a repeat of the inequities observed during the COVID-19 response.⁷⁰

The challenges in the pandemic agreement negotiations illustrate the importance of this report’s focus on the need for more funding, resources and support for partner countries. For future negotiations, it is crucial to ensure more equitable and direct investment in the public health systems of low-income countries to enhance their preparedness for future pandemics. This paper offers valuable lessons that should be considered in this agreement and future development assistance agreements to ensure equity and effectiveness in global development responses.

Part VI: Recommendations

At the time of any post-crisis situation, it is crucial to track donor pledges and disbursements effectively to ensure transparency, accountability, and impact. Despite the billions of dollars pledged globally for ongoing post-crisis situations, there is currently no comprehensive entity responsible for tracking pledges and disbursements, with emphasis on public sector strengthening, leading to inefficiencies and gaps in aid delivery. In the case of COVID-19, the lack of a system in place to track pledges and disbursements makes it difficult to assess whether promises made were kept. Our recommendations aim to address this critical gap by advocating for improved tracking efforts and better alignment with international agreements. These measures, if implemented, will over time enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of development assistance and support the long term development and stability of partner countries.

- 1. Donor pledges and disbursements must be tracked in any post-crisis situation. Disbursements rates, while critical, are not the full story: A critical metric to any recovery or development effort is the percentage of development assistance that is disbursed as grants to partner governments.**

⁶⁹ Global Health Technologies Coalition, Pandemic Agreement Briefer, May 2025, p. 11. https://www.ghcoalition.org/documents/pdf/Pandemic%20Agreement%20Briefer_May%202025.pdf.

⁷⁰ “WHO Director-General's opening remarks at 148th session of the Executive Board,” World Health Organization, January 18, 2021, <https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-148th-session-of-the-executive-board>.

Currently, there are no platforms that comprehensively track donor pledges in post-crisis situations. Although some have attempted to address this gap, there is no internationally agreed-upon entity responsible for systematically tracking donor pledges for global or country-specific recovery efforts. This lack of a unified tracking system makes it challenging for partner countries to gauge the potential funding available to them, and it undermines the accountability of donors in fulfilling their promises. One of the lessons learned from our review of existing platforms is that the current approach to tracking donor aid is donor centric – it is heavily influenced by how the donors categorize their own funding. This is understandable and logical as these platforms are self-reporting platforms created and/or often funded by the donors that rely on them to input their own information. A more partner country centric tracking system could be based in regional centers, such as the Africa CDC (for all health related initiatives) or perhaps the African Union. Other possibilities might include the G7+ or the Group of 77 (G77) at the United Nations – a coalition of 134 developing countries designed to promote their collective interests.

A critical metric to any recovery or development effort is the percentage of development assistance that stays in-country in the form of grants to partner governments: An estimated 85.8 percent of all ODA is not invested in partner countries in the form of budget support. In addition, in regard to humanitarian aid, UN flash appeals often do not allow for the partner governments to receive funding. Yet, the need is clear: Despite the estimated \$60 billion in annual ODA to the poorest countries, none of the 45 poorest countries, home to an estimated 70 percent of people living in extreme poverty, are currently on track to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Evaluating and transforming how development cooperation resources are invested and delivered to these countries is critically needed.

2. Any methodology used for tracking donor funding to partner countries' public sectors needs to carefully distinguish between funds that are in support of the partner country generally, and those that are directly invested in budget support and other government funding structures. This approach reflects the principles set forth in international agreements such as the Paris Declaration and the Busan Partnership.

Currently, the tracking of ODA by the OECD CRS includes funding that donor governments spend through their own agencies, such as U.S. government funding for PEPFAR activities, under the category of “Public Sector” support. While this funding is categorized as “Donor Government” support, it still appears in the aggregate figure for public sector funding. The COVID-19 analysis reveals that of the funds that bilateral

donors disbursed, an estimated 52% of what the OECD CRS categorized as “public sector funding” was funding that falls under the “Donor Government” sub-channel.⁷¹

In addition, funding that is provided to a “third country” is also included in the “Public Sector” funding category. While third country and regional efforts can be a very useful mechanism to support development initiatives, when third country funding is combined with direct investment to the public sector of partner countries, it makes analysis of support to the public sector more difficult. We suggest that public sector support should exclusively include funding that is channeled directly through a partner country’s treasury or ministry to ensure transparency, proper allocation, and effective utilization of resources. This recommendation aligns with the principles set forth in Paris (2005) and Busan (2011), where donors agreed to disburse their funding through public sector institutions and prioritize local procurement as much as possible. (More detailed information on the Paris and Busan agreements is available in Annex I.)

VII. Conclusion

“At the outset of every crisis, it’s critical not only to rely on lessons learned and relearned but to discern lessons that need to be unlearned.” Paul Farmer, March 2020

Discerning lessons that need to be unlearned is often difficult – the natural inclination is to continue with established approaches, even if the results are mixed. In development assistance, we have seen how investing in national and local institutions yields positive outcomes. The Rwanda example shows us the success of this approach – the implementation of their Vision 2020 led to some of the strongest development progress ever documented.⁷² Yet, in settings of poverty, the majority of donor resources are invested outside of the public sector. Donors tend to bypass the public sector and channel their resources through multilateral organizations or their own agencies and NGOs. Doing so, while often leading to positive outcomes for a particular community will not lead to sustainable and long-lasting change over time. Public systems will continue to be weak and unable to withstand any pressure on their structures. This is particularly evident in times of crisis such as the outset of a pandemic. The outbreak of cholera in Haiti (2010), Ebola in West Africa (2014) and COVID-19 across the Global South has shown us that health systems need to be strengthened for them to withstand health

⁷¹ The “Donor Government” sub-channel captures funding that is provided by a donor government to one of its own government agencies.

⁷² Paul Farmer, Cameron Nutt, and Claire Wagner, “Reduced Premature Mortality in Rwanda: Lessons from Success,” *British Medical Journal*, January 2013.

crises. As a first step toward strengthening health systems in settings of poverty the tracking of ODA toward the public sector is essential.

This report underscores the complexities and challenges associated with tracking and disbursing ODA effectively during a global crisis. As COVID-19 began to spread globally in early 2020, the urgent need for financial transparency and accountability became evident. We identified and analyzed existing platforms tracking ODA for the COVID-19 response. Despite initial challenges and fragmented data, significant strides were made to consolidate information, particularly through collaboration with the OECD and the World Bank. The methodology used for this report is different from other existing donor tracking platforms as it highlights what is of particular importance to partner countries as they are the only entity responsible for the delivery of services to their citizens.

The outlook for the poorest countries in the world - those categorized as LDCs or g7+ Member States is worrying - with not one nation on track to meet the SDGs by 2030. The evidence suggests a positive correlation between investment in national institutions and a decrease in poverty and disease - yet donors consistently choose multinationals and international NGOs as their preferred channels of disbursements. While there are very legitimate concerns regarding direct investment in government institutions, donors know how to mitigate risk and important lessons learned can be drawn from evidence of good practice.⁷³ The recommendations set forth in this report - including the need to track pledges and disbursements in post-crisis situations - offer a first step toward providing partner countries with more data and insight into donor funding as they recover from public health crises, natural disasters or conflict situations.

As global health leaders negotiate future pandemic preparedness measures the lessons from this report are insightful. The data-driven insights emphasize the need for more direct investment in public institutions within partner countries to ensure better preparedness and resilience. By addressing these gaps, and realigning efforts in accordance with agreed upon principles set forth in the Paris Declaration and Busan Partnership, the international community can enhance the effectiveness of development assistance and foster stronger, more self-reliant health systems capable of withstanding future health emergencies.

⁷³ Paul Farmer Aid Delivery Support Initiative in partnership with the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser for Community Based Medicine and Lessons from Haiti With contributions from Jacob Hughes, "Are the Paris Principles Being Implemented? An Overview of Localizing Aid in Fragile Settings," Science of Implementation Initiative, June 26, 2013, <https://siidata.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/lessonsfromhaiti/26-june-2014.pdf>.

Part VIII: Annexes

Acronyms used in the annexes below are consistent with those defined in the main body of the report.

Annex I: International Aid Effectiveness Agreements

Donors have made the following commitments with respect to the use of country systems.

International Agreement	Donor Commitments
<p>Paris 2005</p> <p>The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was signed by 166 countries, bilaterals and multilaterals.</p>	<p>Donors commit to use country systems to the extent possible. The target was a two-third or one-third reduction in aid bypassing country systems, depending on the quality of those systems (baseline = 2005).</p> <p>Governments agreed to increase the quality of their systems. Governments agree to assess their systems.</p> <p>Preamble states that use of country systems increases aid effectiveness. It also notes that corruption inhibits use of country systems.</p>
<p>Accra 2008</p> <p>The Accra Agenda for Action was signed by 166 countries, bilaterals and multilaterals.</p>	<p>Donors agreed “to use country systems as the first option for aid programmes in support of activities managed by the public sector.”</p> <p>Donors and governments agree to joint assessments of country systems.</p> <p>If donors decide not to use country systems, then they agree to transparently state their rationale for doing so.</p> <p>Notes that donors and governments agree to fight corruption.</p>
<p>Busan 2011</p> <p>The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation was signed by 211 countries, bilaterals and multilaterals.</p>	<p>Donors commit to “use country systems as the default approach for development cooperation activities managed by the public sector.” The same targets used in the Paris Declaration have been adopted (baseline = 2010).</p> <p>Donors and governments agree to joint assessments of country systems.</p>

	<p>Donors agree that, if the full use of systems is not possible, they will discuss with governments what would be required to move towards full use, including any necessary assistance or changes for the strengthening of systems.</p> <p>Donors and governments also agree to: “fully implement our respective commitments to eradicate corruption, enforcing our laws and promoting a culture of zero tolerance for all corrupt practices. This includes efforts to improve fiscal transparency, strengthen independent enforcement mechanisms, and extend protection for whistleblowers.”</p>
<p>New Deal 2011</p> <p>The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States</p> <p>Signed by 41 countries and multilateral organizations in Busan</p>	<p>Donors will commit to increase the percentage of aid using country systems based on targets agreed at the country level.</p> <p>Donors and development countries agree to: conduct joint assessments; and identify and use joint mechanisms to reduce and better manage risks so as to build the capacity of, and enhance the use of, country systems.</p> <p>On risk, the document states: “We accept the risk of engaging during transition, recognising that the risk of non-engagement in this context can outweigh most risks of engagement...”</p> <p>Partner governments agree to strengthen their financial management systems.</p> <p>Donors and partners also agree to strengthen, or create national reporting and planning systems (e.g. budgets, transparency portals, aid information management systems) and provide support to domestic oversight mechanisms including national parliament.</p>

Note: The term “country systems” broadly refers to government systems related to planning, implementing, and monitoring government programs. In the Paris Declaration, donor commitment to use country systems was measured in relation to their use of public financial management (PFM) and procurement systems.

Annex II: Creating the Data Set and Channels

Data used: In order to create the data set, we used two sets of data:

- 1) World Bank data that they provided directly to us;
- 2) OECD CRS raw data sets available for download. We followed the below set of rules when using this data:

I. Filters:

A. Bilateral and Multilateral Donors (Global)

- Donor: Official Donors, Total
- Sector: COVID-19 Control
- Flow: Official Development Assistance (ODA)⁷⁴
- Channel: All Channels
- Amount type: Current Prices
- Flow Types: Gross Disbursements and Commitments
- Type of Aid: All Types, Total

B. Private Donors

- Donor: Private Donors, Total
- Sector: COVID-19 Control
- Flow: Private Development Finance
- Channel: All Channels
- Amount Type: Current Prices
- Flow Types: Gross Disbursements and Commitments
- Type of Aid: All Types, Total

C. Bilateral and Multilateral Donors to LDCs

- Donor: Official Donors, Total
- Sector: COVID-19 Control
- Flow: Official Development Assistance (ODA)⁷⁵
- Channel: All Channels
- Amount type: Current Prices
- Flow Types: Gross Disbursements and Commitments
- Type of Aid: All Types, Total
- DAC Income Group: LDCs

D. Bilateral and Multilateral Donors to g7+ Member States

⁷⁴ By choosing ODA as flow type, private donors such as foundations are excluded as their funding is considered “private development finance.”

⁷⁵ By choosing ODA as flow type, private donors such as foundations are excluded as their funding is considered “private development finance.”

- Donor: Official Donors, Total
- Sector: COVID-19 Control
- Flow: Official Development Assistance (ODA)⁷⁶
- Channel: All Channels
- Amount type: Current Prices
- Flow Types: Gross Disbursements and Commitments
- Type of Aid: All Types, Total
- We tagged g7+ Member States in our database and filtered by the keyword group g7+

II. Reclassification of OECD CRS Channels

The OECD has 7 parent channels and 18 sub-channels which we reorganized into 14 channels. Table 1 lists our 14 channels and their definitions and Table 2 shows how our 14 channels correspond to the original OECD CRS parent channels and sub-channels.

Table 1: Science of Implementation (SII) Channels

Note: The term “partner country” refers to countries that are recipients of ODA.

SII Channels	Channel Definitions
Partner Government Loans	Loans provided by the donor bilateral or multilateral entity primarily aimed at promoting economic development and welfare in the partner country, and offered at concessional terms (as they qualify as ODA.) This often includes a minimum "grant element" (typically at least 25%) according to OECD discount rate criteria, with lower interest rates, extended repayment periods, or grace periods.
Partner Government Grants	Grants provided to central, state, or local government departments and public corporations in partner countries.

⁷⁶ By choosing ODA as flow type, private donors such as foundations are excluded as their funding is considered “private development finance.”

Donor Governments	Funds provided by a donor government to one of its own government agencies (such as USAID or PEPFAR) to implement specific activities in partner countries.
Third Country Governments (Delegated Cooperation)	Funding channeled through a third-party government, which may be either a donor or partner country, delegated to implement activities in a partner country.
International NGOs	Non-profit, non-governmental organizations operating globally, focusing on development, social, and humanitarian activities. Classified as "international" if they have a global network and diversified funding sources. For OECD purposes, they typically require an annual budget of over \$50 million or are assessed for eligibility based on impact.
National NGOs	Non-profit, non-governmental organizations based within a specific country. These NGOs are distinct from international NGOs and address local development issues within their national context.
Regional NGOs	Non-profit, non-governmental organizations that operate within a specific geographic region, such as a cluster of neighboring countries. Regional NGOs focus on cross-border issues relevant to their area, including trade, health, environment, and human rights, often facilitating cooperation among nations within the region.
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)	Collaborative arrangements between private actors and government agencies to address development issues. PPPs have governance structures with both public officials and private individuals, while networks support similar goals and knowledge-sharing among public, private, and civil society organizations.

Multilateral Organizations	International institutions with governmental membership. These organizations may receive contributions reported as multilateral ODA or act as channels for bilateral ODA, supporting development projects with international collaboration.
Universities, Research Institutes, or Think Tanks	Universities, research institutes or think tanks receive ODA to advance research, knowledge creation, and capacity building in areas critical to low- and middle-income countries. By partnering with governments and international bodies, they contribute directly to achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through interdisciplinary research, policy recommendations, and innovations that benefit developing countries.
International Private Sector	Global private enterprises and financial institutions that receive ODA to support development objectives across borders. Funding often promotes cross-border investments, technology transfer, and partnerships for economic growth and poverty reduction in partner countries.
National Private Sector	Private entities, businesses, and financial institutions within the partner country that receive ODA to promote local development. Funding supports domestic job creation, economic development, and reduced dependence on foreign aid.
Private Sector in Third Country	Private sector entities from countries other than the donor or partner country that receive ODA to support development projects in the partner country. This channel utilizes third-country expertise or resources to meet development objectives.
Other	This channel includes the following: ⁷⁷ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● World Bank Other

⁷⁷ The “Other” channel totals \$8.04 billion (4.7% of total COVID-19 disbursement) and includes OECD CRS “Other” and “Not-Reported” and other entries with no specific sub-channel identified from

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● OECD CRS Other ● OECD CRS Not Reported ● OECD CRS Public Sector unspecified sub-channel ● OECD CRS NGOs and Civil Society unspecified sub-channel ● OECD CRS Private Sector Institutions unspecified sub-channel
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NOTE: These definitions are based on OECD language, with direct language from the OECD used where applicable.

III. Table 2: Correspondence of SII Channel Names with OECD CRS Channels

This table presents a systematic overview of the report’s channel names as they relate to the OECD CRS parent channels and sub-channels, offering clarity on the restructuring process for data analysis in the COVID-19 report context.⁷⁸

SII Channel Name for COVID-19 Report	Correspondence to OECD Parent Channel and/or Sub-Channel	OECD Codes	World Bank Data
Partner Government Loans	Originated from the OECD CRS Public Sector parent channel, specifically isolating the Recipient Government sub-channel, and filtered by Loans.	Recipient Government: Sub-channel code: 12000 Filtered by Loans	World Bank figures included.

Public Sector, NGOs and Civil Society, and Private Sector Institutions parent channels. This figure includes the World Bank amount of \$7.7 billion.

⁷⁸ The codes in this channel and sub-channel categorization structure were derived from the channel and sub-channel codes reported in the OECD CRS raw data for 2020, 2021, and 2022.

Partner Government Grants	Originated from the OECD CRS Public Sector parent channel, specifically isolating the Recipient Government sub-channel, and filtered by Grants.	Recipient Government: Sub-channel code: 12000 Filtered by Grants	World Bank figures included.
Donor Governments	Disaggregated this sub-channel from the OECD Public Sector parent channel.	Donor Government: sub-channel code: 11000	No World Bank figures reported.
Third Country Governments (Delegated Cooperation)	Disaggregated this sub-channel from the OECD Public Sector parent channel.	Third Country Government (Delegated Cooperation): sub-channel code: 13000	No World Bank figures reported.
International NGOs	This channel combines two sub-channels from the OECD CRS parent channel NGOs and Civil Society: International NGOs and Donor Country Based NGOs.	International NGO sub-channel code: 21000 Donor Country-Based NGO sub-channel code: 22000	No World Bank figures reported.
National NGOs	The OECD CRS sub-channel Developing Country Based NGOs in the parent channel NGOs and Civil Society included NGOs that were both national and	Developing Country-Based NGOs sub-channel code: 23000	No World Bank figures reported.

	regional. We separated that sub-channel by entries that included a country name to create this National NGO Channel.	Those with specific country names in the data.	
Regional NGOs	The OECD CRS sub-channel Developing Country Based NGOs in the parent channel NGOs and Civil Society included NGOs that were both national and regional. We separated that sub-channel by entries that did not include a country name to create this Regional NGO Channel.	Developing Country-Based NGOs sub-channel code: 23000 Those lacking specific country names in the data.	No World Bank figures reported.
Public Private Partnerships	No change; maintained as is in the OECD CRS. (This channel includes two sub-channels Public Private Partnership and Network.)	Parent channel code: 30000 Public Private Partnership sub-channel code: 31000 Network sub-channel code: 32000	No World Bank figures reported.
Multilateral Organizations	No change; maintained as is in the OECD CRS,	Sub-channel codes: 40000-47000 41000: UN Entities	No World Bank figures reported.

	(This channel includes all 7 sub-channels under this parent channel.)	<p>42000: European Union Institutions (EU)</p> <p>43000: International Monetary Fund (IMF)</p> <p>44000: World Bank Group (WB)</p> <p>45000: No detail listed for this code</p> <p>46000: Regional Development Bank</p> <p>47000: Other Multilateral Institution</p>	
University, Research Institute, or Think Tank	No change; maintained as is in the OECD CRS.	Parent Channel and sub-channel codes: 50000 and 51000	No World Bank figures reported.
International Private Sector	Disaggregated this sub-channel from the Private Sector Institutions OECD CRS parent channel.	Private Sector in Provider Country sub-channel code 61000	World Bank figures included.
National Private Sector	Disaggregated this sub-channel from the Private Sector Institutions OECD CRS parent channel.	Private Sector in Recipient Country sub-channel code: 62000	No World Bank figures reported.
Private Sector in Third Country	Disaggregated this sub-channel from the Private Sector Institutions OECD CRS parent channel.	Private Sector in Third Country sub-channel code: 63000	No World Bank figures reported.

<p>Other</p>	<p>Combined the following categories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● World Bank Other ● OECD CRS Other ● OECD CRS Not Reported ● OECD CRS Public Sector entries with no sub-channel code ● OECD CRS NGOs and Civil Society entries with no sub-channel code ● OECD CRS Private Sector entries with no sub-channel code 	<p>Code for Parent Channel Other: 90000</p> <p>Codes for Parent Channel Public Sector 10000,</p> <p>Code for Parent Channel NGO and Civil Society 20000</p> <p>Code for Parent Channel Private Sector 60000</p> <p>(These parent channel entries were not coded with a sub-channel and represent a de minimis percentage of these channels.)</p>	<p>World Bank figures included.</p>
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Annex III. Determining Pledged Amounts

The COVID-19 report utilized a structured approach to determine the figures pledged to address COVID-19 globally. The methodology categorized donor pledges into five distinct groups, ensuring a comprehensive and accurate representation of the pledged amounts. Below are the categories and the approach used for each:

1. Donors That Made Public Pledges

For the 29 donor entities that made public pledges identified as ODA either in press reports or in press releases and their websites, the pledged amounts were used.

Donor Entity	Pledge (\$ million)
World Bank*	\$150,000.00
Japan	\$10,907.39
United States	\$10,573.18
EU Institutions	\$9,910.73
Germany	\$6,772.41
France	\$2,601.53
Canada	\$2,394.45
United Kingdom	\$2,186.70
Norway	\$1,245.07
OPEC Fund for International Development	\$1,200.00
Switzerland	\$1,047.98
Italy	\$794.18

Saudi Arabia	\$782.80
Sweden	\$665.00
Korea	\$662.00
Spain	\$598.43
Turkey	\$417.02
Australia	\$410.14
Netherlands	\$390.54
Poland	\$270.70
New Zealand	\$233.82
Kuwait	\$154.00
Denmark	\$94.14
Luxembourg	\$94.10
Ireland	\$88.86
Belgium	\$87.93
Austria	\$50.48
UAE	\$50.00
Qatar	\$20.00
Total	\$204,703.58

*While the World Bank did make a public pledge, their team was in direct contact with us and provided us with their pledge figure.

2. Donor Entities with Incomplete or Unclear Pledge Details

For the 34 entities for which we were unable to find a public pledge specifically for COVID-19 development assistance, the commitments reported in the OECD CRS were for the pledge amounts.

The commitment figure was also used in place of the pledge for Greece and Hungary as it was significantly higher.

Donor Entity	Pledge (\$ million)
Asian Development Bank	\$1,289.55
Arab Fund (AFESD)	\$420.18
WHO-Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan	\$200.58
Central American Bank for Economic Integration	\$156.58
Islamic Development Bank	\$124.07
Hungary	\$103.67
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	\$84.12
Council of Europe Development Bank	\$70.16
Greece	\$49.38
Portugal	\$51.54
UNDP	\$38.87
Finland	\$38.70

Croatia	\$38.25
Slovakia	\$28.52
Czechia	\$23.50
Azerbaijan	\$23.32
Slovenia	\$22.46
WHO	\$22.00
Bulgaria	\$20.82
Caribbean Development Bank [CarDB]	\$19.18
Iceland	\$14.59
Romania	\$14.41
Latvia	\$11.53
Lithuania	\$6.21
Thailand	\$5.71
Estonia	\$3.33
COVID-19 Response and Recovery Multi-Partner Trust Fund [UN COVID-19 MPTF]	\$2.72
Malta	\$1.49
Inter-American Development Bank	\$0.80
Monaco	\$0.67

Liechtenstein	\$0.64
Cyprus	\$0.35
Joint Sustainable Development Goals Fund [Joint SDG Fund]	\$0.11
Development Bank of Latin America	\$0.03
Total	\$2,887.55

3. Donors Entities with No Pledge or Commitment Details

For four entities that neither made a public pledge toward COVID-19 development assistance nor had a commitment reported in the OECD CRS, the disbursements toward COVID-19 reported in the OECD CRS were used for the pledge amounts.

Donor Entity	Pledge (\$ million)
Gavi	\$241.61
Global Environment Facility [GEF]	\$21.84
African Development Bank	\$15.39
Israel	\$0.09
Total	\$278.93

4. Private Donor That Made Pledges Toward COVID-19

For private donors that made public pledges either through press reports, press releases or on their websites, the pledged amounts were used. Amounts directed towards U.S. domestic and European efforts were subtracted wherever possible.

Public Pledges

Private Donor Name	Pledge (\$ million)
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	\$1,985.00
Mastercard Foundation	\$1,340.00
Rockefeller Foundation	\$947.00
Wellcome Trust	\$162.27
LEGO Foundation	\$150.00
Open Society Foundations	\$145.50
Michael & Susan Dell Foundation	\$100.00
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation	\$82.00
Bloomberg Family Foundation	\$50.00
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	\$41.30
Citi Foundation	\$38.40
UBS Optimus Foundation	\$34.00
Fondation Botnar	\$17.66
Ford Foundation	\$16.00

IKEA Foundation	\$14.10
Conrad N. Hilton Foundation	\$12.79
H&M Foundation	\$0.53
Total	\$5,136.55

5. Private Donor Entities with Incomplete or Unclear Pledge Details

For the 10 private donors for which we were unable to find a public pledge, the commitments reported in the OECD CRS for the pledge amounts.

Private Donor Name	Pledge (\$ million)
Oak Foundation	\$2.03
Omidyar Network Fund, Inc.	\$1.20
Arcadia Fund	\$0.50
Swedish Postcode Lottery	\$0.28
Bernard van Leer Foundation	\$0.24
La Caixa Banking Foundation	\$0.17
Laudes Foundation	\$0.14
German Postcode Lottery	\$0.12
Carnegie Corporation of New York	\$0.10

Jacobs Foundation	\$0.003
Total	\$4.78

Summary of Total Pledged Amounts

- **ODA Announced Pledges:** \$204.70 billion
- **ODA Commitment used as pledge figure:** \$2.89 billion
- **ODA Disbursement used as pledge figure:** \$0.28 billion
- **Private Donors:** \$5.14 billion
- **Total Pledges:** \$213.01 billion

Annex IV: World Bank Donor Profile


World Bank COVID-19 ODA Donor Profile 2020-2022

Total Contributions Toward COVID-19 2020-2022

Figures in USD Billions

Pledge	\$150
Commitment	\$273.8
Disbursement	\$148

World Bank: COVID-19 ODA Disbursement as Percentage of Pledge (USD Billions)




Note: The World Bank pledged \$150 billion in ODA toward COVID-19.

Notes:

1. The COVID-19 data reported by the World Bank aligns with the World Bank's fiscal years, which run from July through June.
2. World Bank's COVID-19 pledged amount was \$150 billion over 15 months (April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2021). There was no target/pledged amount for FY22 (July 2021 – June 2022).
3. World Bank's COVID-19 commitments of \$273.8 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
4. World Bank's COVID-19 disbursements of \$148 billion cover April 2020 – June 2022, a duration of 27 months.
5. All data was provided by World Bank.

World Bank: Global ODA Toward COVID-19 (USD Billions)




Note: The World Bank disbursed \$148 billion in ODA toward COVID-19.

Notes:

1. The Public Sector Loans and Credits disbursed figure is comprised of IBRD loans and IDA credits.
2. The Grants to Partner Governments disbursed figure is comprised of IDA grants.
3. The International Private Sector channel includes the following types of World Bank funding: IFC, MIGA and IDA. For this report, World Bank data showed only a disbursement from the IFC.
4. The Other channel includes the Recipient Executed Trust Fund figures.
5. The World Bank Group did not provide direct support to multilaterals, although some of the funding disbursed may have been used for services provided by UN entities.

World Bank: COVID-19 ODA Disbursements to LDC Partner Governments (USD Billions)



Notes:

- 1. The World Bank disbursed \$31.7 billion in ODA toward COVID-19 to LDC partner governments, representing 21.4 percent of its total disbursement.
- 2. Data may not sum up due to rounding.